John Kenneth Galbraith was a widely recognized economist. He was an advisor to President Kennedy who named him US Ambassador to India. In 1961 Kennedy dispatched Galbraith to meet Diem, study his political and military environment in South Vietnam and seek confirmation from Diem regarding Kennedy’s recent recommendations to reshape his government and military.
Galbraith issued a long, private cable to President Kennedy on November 21, 1961 upon his return from Vietnam.
This cable is part of The Pentagon-Papers, Volume V, B4, Book-I. Galbraith provided a foretelling warning for America. Galbraith’s advice to Kennedy: Drop Diem.
The South Vietnamese desperately needed radical changes to their government, military & economy in order to turn their overall war effort against the North and Viet Cong.
But it did not make the type of impact with JFK and his administration as maybe he had hoped. Kennedy followed Eisenhower and Truman in not heeding the advice from their military, policy advisors and diplomatic corps.
Date: 21 NOV 61
From: New Delhi
FOR THE PRESIDENT
POLICY IN VIETNAM
FROM JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH5. A MAXIMUM OF 18,000 LIGHTLY ARMED MEN ARE INVOLVED IN THE INSURRECTION. THESE ARE GVN ESTIMATES AND THE FACTOR OF EXAGGERATION IS UNQUESTIONABLY CONSIDERABLE. TEN THOUSAND IS MORE PROBABLY. WHAT WE HAVE IN OPPOSITION INVOLVES A HEAVY THEOLOGICAL DISPUTE. DIEM IT IS SAID IS A GREAT BUT DEFAMED LEADER. IT IS ALSO SAID HE HAS LOST TOUCH WITH THE MASSES, IS IN POLITICAL DISREPUTE AND OTHERWISE NO GOOD. THIS DEBATE CAN BE BYPASSED BY AGREED POINTS. IT IS AGREED THAT ADMINISTRATIVELY DIEM IS EXCEEDINGLY BAD. HE HOLDS FAR TOO MUCH POWER IN HIS OWN HANDS, EMPLOYES HIS ARMY BADLY, HAS NO INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION WORTHY OF THE NAME, HAS ARBITRARILY OR INCOMPETENT SUBORDINATES IN THE PROVINCES AND SOME ACHIEVEMENTS NOTWITHSTANDING, HAS A POOR ECONOMIC POLICY. HE HAS ALSO EFFECTIVELY RESISTED IMPROVEMENT FOR A LONG WHILE IN FACE OF HEAVY DETERIORATION. THIS IS ENOUGH. WHETHER HIS POLITICAL POSTURE IS NEPOTIC, DESPOTIC OUT OF TOUCH WITH THE VILLAGERS AND HENCE DAMAGING OR WHETHER THIS DAMAGE IS THE FIGMENT OF SIAGON INTELLECTUALS DOES NOT BEAR ON OUR IMMEDIATE POLICY AND MAY BE PASSED AT LEAST IN PART.
7. THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFICULTIES IN COUNTERING THE INSURGENCY, APART FROM ABSENCE OF INTELLIGENCE, ARE TWO-FOLD. FIRST IS THE POOR COMMAND, DEPLOYMENT, TRAINING, MORAL AND OTHER WEAKNESSES OF THE ARMY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES. AND SECOND WHILE THEY CAN OPERATE —- SWEEP —- THOUGHT ANY PART OF THE COUNTRY AND CLEAR OUT ANY VISIBLE INSURGENTS, THEY CANNOT GUARANTEE SECURITY AFTERWARDS. THE VIET CONG COMES BACK AND PUTS THE ARM ON ALL WHO HAVE COLLABORATED. THIS FACT IS VERY IMPORTANT IN RELATION TO REQUESTS FROM AMERICAN MANPOWER. OUR FORCES WOULD CONDUCT THE ROUND-UP OPERATIONS WHICH THE RVN ARMY CAN ALREADY DO. WE CAN’T CONCEIVABLY SEND ENOUGH MEN TO PROVIDE SAFETY FOR THE VILLAGES AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR AN EFFECTIVELY TRAINED CIVIL GUARD AND HOME DEFENSE FORCE AND, PERHAPS, A POLITICALLY COOPERATIVE COMMUNITY.
8. THE KEY AND INESCAPABLE POINT, THEN, IS THE INEFFECTUALITY (ABETTED DEBATABLY BY THE UNPOPULARITY) OF THE DIEM GOVERNMENT. THIS IS THE STRATEGIC FACTOR. NOR CAN ANYONE ACCEPT THE STATEMENT OF THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN EITHER TOO LONG OR TOO LITTLE IN ASIA THAT HIS IS THE INEVITABLE POSTURE OF THE ASIAN MANDARIN. FOR ONE THING ISN’T TRUE, BUT WERE IT SO THE ONLY POSSIBLE CONCLUSION WOULD BE THAT THERE IS NO FUTURE FOR MANDARINS. THE COMMUNISTS DON’T FAVOR THEM.
10. I COME NOW TO POLICY, THE FIRST IN BOX WE ARE IN PARTLY AS THE RESULT OF RECENT MOVES AND SECOND HOW WE GET OUT WITHOUT A TAKEOVER. WE HAVE JUST PROPOSED TO HELP DIEM IN VARIOUS WAYS IN TERURN FO RA PROMISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL REFORMS. SINCE THE ADMINISTRATIVE (AND POSSIBLY) POLITICAL INEFFECTUALITY ARE THE STRATEGIC FACTORS FOR SUCCESS THE ABILITY TO GET REFORM IS DECISIVE. WITH THEM THE NEW AID AND GADGETRY WILL BE USEFUL WITHOUT THEM THE HELICOPTERS, PLANES AND ADVISER’S WON’T MAKE APPRECIABLE DIFFERENCE.
11. IN MY COMPLETELY CONSIDERED VIEW, AS STATED YESTERDAY, DIEM WILL NOT REFORM EITHER ADMINISTRATIVELY OR POLITICALLY IN ANY EFFECTIVE WAY. THAT IS BECUSE HE CANNOT. IT IS POLITICALLY NAIVE TO EXPECT IT. HE SENSES THAT HE CANNOT LET POWER GO BECAUSE HE WOULD BE THROWN OUT. HE MAY DISGUISE THIS EVEN FROM HIMSELF WITH THE STATEMENT THAT HE LACKS EFFECTIVE SUBORDINATES BUT THE CIRCUMSTANCE REMAINS UNCHANGED. HE PROBABLY SENSES THAT HIS GREATEST DANGER IS FROM THE ARMY. HENCE THE REORM THAT WILL BRING EFFECTIVE US EO FHIS MANPOWER, THROUGH THE MOST URGENT MAY BE THE MOST IMPROBABLE.15. IT FOLLOWS FROM MY REASONING THAT THE ONLY SOLUTION MUST BE TO DROP DIEM. KOREA REPRESENTS THE ONLY MODEL THAT HOLDS OUT ANY PROMISE WHATEVER FOR US. WITHOUT DOUBT DIEM WAS A SIGNIFICANT FIGURE IN HIS DAY. BUT HE HAS RUN HIS COURSE. HE CANNOT BE REHABILITATED. INCIDENTALLY THIS VIEW IS HELD INDEPENDENTLY BY THE SENIOR POLITICAL COUNSELOR OF THE EMBASSY, THE MAN WHO HAS BEEEN LONGEST IN VIETNAM.
16. IN MY VIEW, AND THIS IS THE NECESSARILY SPECULATIVE, DROPPING DIEM WILL NEITHER BE DIFFERENT NOR UNDULY DANGEROUS. THE VIET CONG ARE IN POSITION TO CAUSE TROUBLE WIDELY OVER THE COUNTRY. THAT IS FAR FROM MEANING THAT THEY ARE ABLE WITH THEIR SMALL NUMBER OT TAKE OVER AND CONTROL THE COUNTRY. THE ARMY IF INEFFECTIVE IS THOUGHT TO BE NON-COMMUNIST. THE RUMORS OF COUPS ARE ENDEMIC. NOLTING WHIEL NOT IN FAVOR HAS SAID THAT A NOT FROM THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE INFLUENTIAL. AT THE EARLIEST MOVEMENT THAT IT BECOMES EVIDENT THAT DIEM WILL NOT AND CANNOT IMPLEMENT ANY REAL WAY THE REFORMS WASHINGTON HAS REQUESTED WE SHOULD MAKE IT QUIETLY CLEAR THAT WE ARE WITHDRAWING OUR SUPPORT FROM HIM AS AN INDIVIDUAL. HIS DAY WOULD THEN I BELIEVE BE OVER. WHILE NO ONE CAN PROMISE A SFAE TRANSITION WE ARE NOT MARRIED TO FAILURE.
20. IT WILL BE SAID THAT WE NEED TROOPS FOR A SHOW OF STRENGTH AND DETERMINATION IN THE AREA. SINCE THE TROOPS WILL NOT DEAL WITH FUNDAMENTAL FAULTS – – SINCE THERE CAN’T BE ENOUGH OF THEM TO GIVE SECURITY TO THE COUNTRYSIDE – – THEIR FAILURE TO PROVIDE SECURITY COULD CREATE A WORSE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE. YOU WILL BE AWARE OF MY GENERAL RELUCTANCE TO MOVE IN TROOPS. ON THE OTHER HAND I WOULD NOTE THAT IT IS THOSE OF US WHO HAVE WORKED IN THE POLITICAL VINEYARD, AND WHO HAVE COMMITTED OUR HEARTS MOST STRONGLY TO THE POLITICAL FORTUNES OF THE NEW FRONTIER WHO WORRY MOST ABOUT ITS BRIGHT PROMISE BEIGN SUNK UNDER THE RICE FIELDS. DULLES IN 1954 SAW THE DANGERS IN THIS AREA. DEAN ACHESON KNEW HE COUND NOT INVEST MEN IN CHIANG.
24. MY OVERALL FEELING IS THAT DEPITE THE ERROR IMPLICIT IN THIS LAST MOVE AND THE SUPPOSITION THAT DIEM CAN BE REFORMED, THE SITUATION IS NOT HOPELESS. IT IS ONLY HOPELESS IF WE MARRY OUR COURSE TO THAT OF A MAN WHO MUST SPEND MORE TIME PROTECTING HIS OWN POSITION AND EXCLUDING THOSE HOW THREATEN IS THAN IN FIGHTING THE INSURGENCY. DIEM’S CALCULATION INSTINCTIVE OR DELIBERATE IS EVIDENT. HE HAS ALREADY BEEN OPOSED ONCE AND NOT BY THE COMMUNISTS. WE CAN SEE HIS CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER AS WELL AS ANYONE.
END OF MESSAGE
The war in Vietnam under President Kennedy was certainly in transition. Eisenhower continued to support anti-communist resistance in South East Asia. It has become clear the new President saw South East Asia differently. Kennedy dispatched Galbraith to Vietnam for such a confirmation of events in Saigon. Kennedy took a new approach that put his focus on Vietnam rather than Laos as Eisenhower advised during their Presidential transitional consultations.