Classified memorandum from Roosevelt to Hirohito December 6 1941
Source:
United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense
AKA The Pentagon Papers
Volume V-B1: The Roosevelt Administration 1940-1945 – Page 27 (pdf link)
Ran across this in my Facebook feed yesterday. It was a post from RantPolitical. Its nothing more than Pearl Harbor revisited, a post of interesting facts surrounding the Japanese attack.
Yet first “fact” presented (screenshot below) was an accusation President Roosevelt knowingly led America into war. The announcement just this week that the Defense Department will exhume the remains of our fellow patriots killed aboard the USS Oklahoma.
For over 40 years the US Government classified a secret study by the RAND Corporation regarding our growing role in Vietnam’s internal conflict. Simply known as The Pentagon Papers the 48 volume study was commissioned by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. The formal report titled United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense was leaked to the New York Times by Daniel Ellsberg, a RAND analyst who previously served as a US Marine first lieutenant commanding a rifle company in Vietnam in the 1950s.
So where does this all lead? One thing about History: In time when evidence is presented through the process of discovery, a deeper analysis can be established.
Relations between the U.S. and Japan were frail (at best) as Japan expanded war into Indo-China by defeating the French. Its clear war was in the air. Yet The Pentagon Papers reveal numerous communications between U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Kichisabura Nomura, Japan’s Ambassador to the U.S. After Japan attacked Pearl Harbor Roosevelt famously announced to Congress:
“Yesterday, December 7, 1941 – a date which will live in infamy – the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan. The United States was at peace with that nation and, at the solicitation of Japan, was still in conversation with its Government and its Emperor looking toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific.”
Volume V-B1: The Roosevelt Administration 1940-1945 also contains a classified memorandum sent by President Roosevelt to Japanese Emperor Hirohito saber rattling the Emperor regarding Japan’s occupation of Saigon. Roosevelt suggested unless Japanese forces withdraw he would consider sending the U.S. military to Saigon to confront Japanese troops and restore French rule in Indo-China. This memorandum (beginning on page 27 of Volume V-B1) was transmitted to the Government of Japan on December 6, 1941.
War between Japan and the U.S. was literally hours away. The declining dialog clearly indicate war was only a matter of time. Is it enough to suggest a conspiracy that Roosevelt was leading America into war? That may still be a debate issue. However to label it “fringe fanaticism” with little evidence…I recommend reading the entire V-B1 volume in detail.
If I Die in a Combat Zone by Tim O’Brien was a fast yet welcoming read last night. I finished this book in just under three hours. He writes about his experience in Vietnam, thoughts of escaping to Europe and stories about fellow soldiers in Alpha Company from 1969 to 1970 which included supporting the area of the My Lai Massacre just one year after the atrocities.
O’Brien shares a brief story of growing up in the Midwest and life in Worthington Minnesota.
He shares his experiences joining the army. If I Die in a Combat Zone shares how fellow soldiers were not fully committed by 1969 to fighting a losing war.
He shares his relationship with a soldier “Erik” who also disagrees with the war and their experiences at Fort Lewis before begin shipped to Vietnam.
The bitter topic of desertion is addressed as O’Brien planned to dessert while on leave and make his way to Sweden. Yet after all his detailed research and staying in a hotel with an AWOL bag fully packed, he does not desert. Midwestern values played a strong influence.
If I Die in a Combat Zone reveals O’Brien served around My Lai, the site of the US Army My Lai Massacre, but as the book closes he writes about getting a job out of the company’s combat zone and ends up working for an officer investigating the massacre led by William Calley and Charlie Company of the same battalion O’Brien served just one year later.
After reading No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War I could not help but think about the consequences failed data reporting by MACV can serve a historical lesson for re-implementing or adjusting campus data reporting systems.
Key stakeholders on campus should easily state their reasons for data collection and reporting. No Sure Victory benefits campus units by revealing an early, dare I say Big Data approach to unstructured data reporting and delivering actionable data.
Today we immediately understand Google’s Compute Engine or an Amazon Elastic MapReduce cloud for this demand.
Universities can thrive with diverse reporting teams. Working with Institutional Research and striving to improve enrollment and retention efforts are key goals. Yet important roles are filled with student workers. Here unstructured data often fragments over mismanagement. Many ad hoc Microsoft Excel documents are created without data governance and become silo’d from the campus data warehouse. Key stakeholders on any campus including CIOs, IR Directors, Research staff, Program Directors, campus data reporter writers and student workers. Even seasoned campus data report writers are not leveraged to streamline actionable data insights.
No Sure Victory brings to light a tragic failed data reporting implementation by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in addressing a war in Vietnam. The was his reputation as one of The Wiz Kids, the World War II Statistical Control unit that analyzed operational and logistical data to manage war.
In many ways my desire to understand the US failure in Vietnam has been a long difficult road. No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War by Gregory Daddis answers many long held questions.
After digesting so many resources in books, documentaries and listening to interviews with veterans, politicians and social leaders during the long duration of the war.
I believe No Sure Victory reveals strong indicators regarding our failure in Vietnam. The focus is the failure of MACV to gather and process data against an established set of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) over the long duration of this war.
Daddis documents McNamara’s injection of data gathering (metrics) when LBJ increased America’s commitment to South Vietnam. McNamara’s experience as one of The Wiz Kids seemed to set the stage in his role as Secretary of Defense. Yet our enemy was determined and battle tested. America was fighting a larger, strategic cold war with an emerging China and the established Soviet Union in both Europe and Asia.
Daddis sheds light throughout No Sure Victory not only on the lack of White House direction but how MACV leadership could not adapt to fighting a war of counterinsurgency. The impact of this television war confused the government, media and our country. At the same time Daddis points to key failures in not understanding the full affect of the French Indo-China war regarding counterinsurgency. This lack of understanding established a crippling third leg the US consistently fought to balance against the cold war political spectrum.