The Pentagon Papers reveal President Kennedy’s planned withdrawal from Vietnam in August 1961. The Papers [Part V. B-4] Justification of the War. Internal Documents. The Kennedy Administration. Book II reveal (page 544) a clear frustration with South Vietnamese President Diem.
The frustration with Diem appears to have actually reached a point of abandoning the US commitment. Diem’s totalitarian rule against all dissent, especially with the backdrop of the Buddhist crisis had driven a wedge between Washington and Saigon.
Diem and his brother Nhu (who ran the South Vietnamese secret police) used the crisis as a way to arrest all suspected threats to their rule. Torture was widely used to force confessions.
This included arresting members of military who were just on the outside of Diem’s inner circle of generals. Subsequent files reveal the US had to interject to secure the release of some senior military advisors who were supporting Washington who were among those students arrested and tortured during the Buddhist crisis.
The President initiated a series of meeting which outcome reporting from Saigon showed a shift in US views towards fighting communism in Asia:7b. The second basic factor, as outlined by Hilsman, was what effect will be felt on our programs elsewhere in Asia if we acquiesce to a strong Nhu-dominated government. In this connection, he reported that there is a Korean study now under-way on just how much repression the United states will tolerate before pulling out her aid. Mr. McNamara stated that he had not seen this study and would be anxious to have it.
7c. The third basic factor is Mr. Nhu, his personality and his policy. Hilsman recalled that NQu has once already launched an ef~ort aimed at withdrawal of our province advisors and stated that he is sure he is in conversation with the French. He gave, as supporting evidence, the content of an intercepted message, which Mr. Bundy asked to see. Ambassador Nolting expressed the opinion that Diem will not make a deal with Ho Chi Minh on Ho’s terms.
8. Mr. Kattenburg stated that as recently as last Thursday it was the belief of Ambassador Lodge that, if we undertake to live with this repressive regime, with its bayonets at every street corner: and its transparent negotiations with puppet bonzes, we are going to be thrown out of the country in six months. He stated that at this juncture it would be better for us to make the decision to get out honorably. He went on to say that, having been acquainted with Diem for ten years, he was deeply disappointed in him, saying that he will not separate from his brother. It was Kattenburg’s view that Diem.
9. General Taylor asked what Kattenburg meant when he said that we would be forced out of Vietnam within six months. Kattenburg replied that in from six months to a year, as the people see we are losing the war, they will gradually go to the other side and we will be obliged to leave. Ambassador Nolting expressed general disagreement with Mr. Kattenburg. He said that the unfavorable activity which motivated Kattenburg’s remarks was confined to the city and, while city support of Diem is doubtless less now, it is not greatly so. He said that it is improper to overlook the fact that we have done a tremendous job toward winning the Vietnam war, working with this same imperfect, annoying government.will get very little support from the military and, as time goes on, i he will get less and less support and the country will go steadily down hill.
13. The Vice President stated that he agreed with Secretary Rusk’s conclusions completely; that he had great reservations himself with respect to a coup, particularly so because he had never really seen a , genuine alternative to Diem. He stated that from both a practical and a political viewpoint, it would be a disaster to pullout; that we should stop playing cops and robbers and get back to talking straight to the GVN, and that we should once again go about winning the war. He stated that after our communications with them are genuinely reestablished, it may be necessary for someone to talk rough to them – perhaps General Taylor. He said further that he had been greatly impressed with Ambassador Nolting’s views and agreed with Mr. McNamara’s conclusions.
In just two years the administration was shifting to a policy of withdrawing US troops by 1965. The corruption surrounding Diem was endless and his unwillingness to heed Kennedy’s written letter of changes simply came and went. Kennedy policy advisors suggested that tensions were so high in Saigon that another coup was just around the corner. It tuned out to be something Washington was open to pursuing.