Reaching page 1,758 of the Pentagon Papers (Part IV-C4 Evolution of the War Marine Combat Units Go to Da Nang, March 1965) provides a growing stream of reports and studies that the war in South Vietnam was “lost” as early as 1960. Yet both Kennedy and Johnson decided to ignore those studies and marched America into Vietnam.
As Part IV-C.4. reveals research, studies & politics all concluded that South Vietnamese armed forces were on the brink of collapse against the Viet Cong. The document provides the data that should have not only questioned the decision to deploy US forces but the questioned the role of the US in Vietnam vs Laos.
It was just one terrible decision by the White House after 20 years of continued support for the South Vietnamese. The “no surprise at the time of deployment” was an existing 20,000 American force of military and policy advisers supporting the South Vietnamese air force and government.
An emerging mistake in the previous part “[Part IV. C. 3.] Evolution of the War. Rolling Thunder Program Begins: January – June 1965″ is the “automatic reliance” on superior air power to defeat the NVA and Viet Cong. I believe Nixon proved this wrong at the very end of the war.
Looking back — One should not help but evaluate these hard lessons from David Halberstam’s The Best and The Brightest published in 1972 (my review here) Kennedy seemed to have the top researchers and policy advisors like McGeorge Bundy, Robert McNamara, Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow continue policies established by Presidents Truman and Eisnenhower regarding Southeast Asia, Laos and Vietnam. Halberstam looked at the promise of the young Kennedy think-tank and drew upon his own lessons while reporting from Vietnam. Halberstam was awarded a 1964 Pulitzer prize for International Reporting on the war in Vietnam and the overthrow of the Diem regime.