The Pentagon Papers: The Secret History of the Vietnam War by Neil Sheehan and The New York Times is an amazing story. Just re-published in December 2017, Sheehan, was an established, respected reporter on Vietnam. This period was an extraordinary time of change in our country as President Nixon expanded the war in Vietnam.
Sheehan obtained a complete copy of the top secret Pentagon Papers from Daniel Ellsberg, a RAND consultant and contributor to the papers. The publishing of the Pentagon Papers would lead Nixon’s re-election committee, somewhat appropriately named CREEP to plan and execute the Watergate break-in. This action was a direct result of the Pentagon Papers leaking, and ultimately, Nixon’s resignation.
However the Papers, initiated by his Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara date back to 1945. The initial volumes reveal the American effort to save Vietnam was effectively lost before 1960.
The most striking reports of early failure in Vietnam and Indochina occurred prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and stretched through the 1954 Geneva Conference. This put to rest an notion Vietnam was a development of the Kennedy administration.
As released by The National Archives: the initial 20 year period of American influence regarding Vietnam, Indochina, Imperial France and Communist China:
[Part I] Vietnam and the U.S. 1940-1950
[Part II] U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1950-1954
[Part III] The Geneva Accords
[Part IV. A.1.] Evolution of the War. NATO and SEATO: A Comparison
[Part IV. A.2.] Evolution of the War. Aid for France in Indochina, 1950-54
[Part IV. A.3.] Evolution of the War. U.S. and France’s Withdrawal from Vietnam, 1954-56
[Part IV. A.4.] Evolution of the War. U.S. Training of Vietnamese National Army, 1954-59
[Part IV. A.5.] Evolution of the War. Origins of the Insurgency
It is a surprise to see American global power under Truman and Eisenhower in the aftermath of World War II appeared had little influence upon eventual intervention in Vietnam:
At key points during these years, the Pentagon study says, the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations made far-reaching decisions on Vietnam policy that the public knew little about or misunderstood.
A key point came in the winter of 1949-50 when the United States made what the account describes as a watershed decision affecting American policy in Vietnam for the next two decades: After the fall of mainland China to the Chinese Communists, the Truman Administration moved to support Emperor Bao Dai and provide military aid to the French against the Communist-led Vietminh.
Then in August, 1954, came the decision that the Pentagon account says determined United States policy toward Vietnam for the rest of the decade: The National Security Council launched its program of economic an military aid to Mr. Diem, then Premier and later President, though its action was not made public for months.
The Pentagon account discloses that the most of these major decision from 1950 on were made against the advice of the American intelligence community.
Intelligence analysts in the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department and sometimes the Pentagon repeatedly warned the French, Emperor Bao Dai and Premier Diem were weak and unpopular and that the Communists were strong.
It is very important to understand Eisenhower’s development of the Domino Theory. Developed after the loss of China to communism, this became the overwhelming position of US foreign policy for the next fifty years. Yet after the fall of Vietnam in 1975 the theory never developed.
This failure falls directly to Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. It is worth reviewing in the longer view since February 1954:
The basic rationale for American involvement — what later came to be called the domino theory — was first clearly enunciated by the National Security Council in February 1950, when it decided to extend military aid to the French in Indochina. “It is important to U.S. security interests,” the Council said, “that all practical measures be taken to prevent further Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Indochina is a key area and is under immediate threat.
“The neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma could be expected to fall under Communist domination if Indochina is controlled by a Communist government. The balance of Southeast Asia would then be in grave hazard.”
Subsequent Council decision papers throughout the nineteen-fifties repeated this formulation with every increasing sweep. A council paper approved by President Eisenhower in January, 1954, predicted that the “loss of any single country” in Southeast Asia would ultimately lead to the loss of all Southeast Asia, then India and Japan, and finally “endanger the stability and security of Europe.”
The domino theory and the assumptions behind it were never questioned, “the Pentagon account says of the Eisenhower years. The result was that the Government’s internal debate usually centered more on matters of military feasibility than on questions of basic national interests.
The opening chapter “The Truman and Eisenhower Years: 1945-1960” offer sound evidence the key years to defeat the Vietcong were defined, and missed very early in America’s engagement. Kennedy inherited a growing tragedy from Truman and Eisenhower, with Johnson inheriting the same.
The US position from 1945 to allow France to re-institute colonialism (slavery) across Indochina was appalling to FDR. More amazingly revealed in the opening chapters, US involvement in Vietnam began with FDR and then Truman during World War II. Eisenhower dispatched Edward Lansdale to Vietnam while the Geneva convention was just opening. This diplomatic conference followed the French debacle at Dien Bien Phu.
The early volumes of the Pentagon Paper reveal how Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles, US Secretaries of State paved the way for America’s dark walk into Southeast Asia for a coming generation. Over 58,000 Americans were killed in Southeast Asia from 1945 to 1975.
Yet Sheehan reveals the deepening US commitment to Vietnam began during World War II. The Pentagon Papers also reveal, much to the surprise of many President Roosevelt’s memorandums to Japanese Emperor Hirohito prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. The focus was Japanese troops invasion and occupation of Saigon. FDR ‘saber rattled’ sending US troops to Siagon to remove the Japanese forces.
As much of this book details the early acquisition, reivew and publishing of hte Papers, this is as much Sheehan’s story of how he came into contact with Daniel Ellsberg, and how the Times organization decided to publish along with the efforts of US Attorney General John Mitchell, on behalf of President Nixon to suppress The Times from further publication. Clearly Ellsberg delivered more volumes of research (7,912 pages) than any single reporter could absorb. The Times added fellow Vietnam reporters Hedrick Smith, E.W. Kenworthy and Fox Butterfield. Yet it was stunning to discover the Times’ outside law firm, Lord Day & Lord refused to represent their client and actually considered reporting that Sheehan had a copy of the classified report to the Justice Department.
The book contains the detailed coverage by Sheehan regarding every court challenged faced by the paper and the Washington Post in New York Times Co. v. United States, which remains today, especially today to be an extraordinary moment re-enforcing the First Amendment.