atomic bomb Archives - Don Kasprzak

The Pentagon Papers include a memorandum with Robert Kennedy on April 29, 1961 regarding a yet-to-be-determined US military position regarding fighting the spread of communism in Laos.

Pentagon Papers Robert Kennedy as the just recently confirmed US Attorney General under his brother and President-elect was a participant to foreign policy planning. The Kennedy Administration was roughly 90 days old when this memorandum [Part V. B. 4.] Justification of the War. Internal Documents. The Kennedy Administration. Book I (page 93) was recorded.

In attendance was Robert Kennedy, Secretary of Defense McNamara, General Curtis Le May, General David M. Shoup, Admiral Arleigh Burke and McGeorge Bundy among others.

This emerging view is similar to the policy supported during the Eisenhower Administration. As conveyed in David Halberstam’s The Best and The Brightest, President-elect Kennedy was briefed by Eisenhower that US troops would be fighting communism in SouthEast Asia. The only surprise for John Kennedy (and for most Americans) was Eisenhower’s plans to invade and fight in Laos — not Vietnam. The memorandum indicates the new administration had yet to decide how to best deal with the growing communist influence in SouthEast Asia:

The Attorney General asked where would be the best place to stand and fight, in Southeast Asia,where to draw the line. Mr. McNamara said he thought we would take a stand in Thailand and South Viet-Nam. The Attorney General asked whether we would save any of Laos, but he major question was whether we would stand up and fight.

Mr. McNamara said that we would have to attack the DRV if we gave up Laos. Mr. McNamara repeated that the situation is now worse than it was five weeks ago. Mr. Steeves pointed out that the same problems existed in South Viet-Nam, but

Admiral Burke thought that South Viet-Nam could be more easily controlled. General Becker then suggested that troops be moved into Thailand and South Viet-Nam to see whether such action would not produce a cease-fire. Admiral Burke asked what happens if there is still no cease-fire. General Decker said then we would be ready to go ahead. Mr. Kennedy said we would look sillier than we do now if we got troops in there and then backed down. He reiterated the question whether we are ready to go the distance.

It appears the new administration viewed a communist threat in Laos as more severe than Vietnam. Now the issue was containment of communist influence in Asia. And an even more chilling statement emerged from this meeting regarding Laos:

French request to US: Drop 3 atomic bombs at Dien Bien Phu

The Pentagon Papers revealed a startling event: France requested the US Air Force drop three atomic bombs at Dien Bien Phu. The French Union troops were being overrun by the Viet Minh and their well placed and deadly accurate cannon fire in the surrounding hills of the French garrison.
French artillery commander Charles Piroth realizing his overconfident plan to easily silence their cannons committed suicide in his bunker after the opening days of the siege.

This loss was the tipping point for France’s failure as a post World War II colonial empire, their exit from Indochina and the world stage.

France initially declassified documents regarding Dien Bien Phu in 2005. They acknowledged a very active role of by the US Air Force during the siege. Two US Air Force pilots were killed over the battlefield. They were awarded France’s highest military honor by the French Ambassador to the United States.

The battle began on March 13, 1953 with their surrender on May 7th. The Americans were killed in the final three days of battle.

The Pentagon Papers confirm 38 US Air Force pilots flew at least 682 sorties over the course of the siege. The Pentagon Papers more importantly reveal French cables to Washington (just 10 days into the month-long siege) requesting US air support and eventually the Eisenhower White House considered atomic bombs to Viet Minh positions surrounding the garrison’s hills.

President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles actually kept this nuclear option on the table until the British ambassador in London notified Dulles that Britain would not support the French request.