Dien Bien Phu and the Crisis of Franco-American Relations, 1954-1955 by Lawrense Kaplan, Denise Arraud, and Mark Rubin. This research is certainly a very intriguing collection of American and French academics re-approaching the relationship during the key event that would be driving American foreign policy for a generation.
Published in 1980, these insights offers the west deep new, modern insights into post World War II Asia. Therefore I have embedded an extended series of quotes which highlight the historical, complex, and strained relationship between France and the United States during the siege that would cast aside France from the world’s stage as a power.
Readers can certainly view Japan’s attack of Pearl Harbor, Truman’s betrayal of FDR, and Eisenhower’s failures in a new light. The papers also addresses the domino theory, the deep conflicts between Ely and Radford that ultimately focused on the failed attempt at Operation Vulture. Yet nothing could save France from defeat even with atomic weapons.
Finally, the French 1955 attempted coup d’état reveals the absolute desperation of French attempts to claw back into Vietnam. These topics jumped out as key strains between Franco-American relations that linger into the 1960s. My Dien Bien Phu retrospective is certainly expanding via this research.
Table of Contents:
Prologue: Perceptions by the United States of its interests in Indochina
1. Franco-American conflict in Indochina, 1950-1954
2. The French military and U.S. participation in the Indochina War
3. Britain and the crisis over Dien Bien Phu, April 1954
4. Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dien Bien Phu: “The day we didn’t go to war”
5. Military necessity, political impossibility: French overview on operation Vautour
6. Redefining the American position in Southeast Asia
7. From Geneva to Manila: British policy toward Indochina and SEATO
8. Passage of empire: the United States, France, and South Vietnam, 1954-55
9. Repercussions of the Geneva Conference: South Vietnam under a new protector
10. Spring 1955: Crisis in Saigon
11. The United States, NATO, and French Indochina
12. France between the Indochina War and the European defense community
Even the Prologue: Perceptions by the United States of its interests in Indochina by Richard Immerman will startle readers. Immerman suggests Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor an intentional ploy to divert global interest away from their aims across Indochina. Certainly this appears true today.
Yet for Americans this is a rather stark suggestion. Yet upon reflection there is merit to the Japan’s single strike. Why risk resources in Indochina when a full defensive strategy against America would culminate in the the atomic bombing of their mainland.
Japan had already invaded and conquered China. France surrendered to Japanese troops across Indochina, yet managed to negotiate terms after Japan’s invasion of French Indochina in 1940. At the height of the second French colonial empire, Paris ruled almost 9% of the global population.
Set against Communist China and the Soviet Union, President Eisenhower ultimately shaped a policy leading America to war for a generation. Resource rich Indochina would be providing Japan much needed raw materials to drive their war effort. When American banned oil sales to the Japanese mainland, Indochina became their target.
