The Battle of Dien Bien Phu by Jules Roy. Jules was a French writer and outspoken critic of French colonialism across Indochina. Jules published this book just seven years following the French defeat. To his credit, he wrote a detailed book and a trip back to the valley writing with the knowledge available to him at that time.
Much of the information was raw and new scholarship would remain elusive for decades. North Vietnam’s essential documents along with those of the French, British, and American governments were still classified. To this end, the facts have not really changed, only the recent access to NVA documents helps shape context today.
However, Roy portrays an honest, detailed assessment of the battle based upon a return visit to the valley. Roy is perhaps one of the early recognized authors of the siege. While subsequent authors have added valuable additions to the west’s understanding, his efforts certainly allowed for early insights by Americans just as Vietnam began to come into greater focus across our country.
Yet, America was still awash in post-World War II success and global expansion under then President Eisenhower. But the warning signs across Laos and Cambodia were ringing.
Roy introduces the appointment of General Navarre as commander of French forces in Vietnam. Navarre’s plan, with the approval of the US was to provoke Giap by duplicating the success at at Na San and ultimately push the Viet Minh into a final pitched battle at Dien Bien Phu.
French ignorance of their enemy
While Navarre was certainly overconfident, he held no prior battle experience across Indochina. Worse yet, he refused to listen to his junior officers. In addition, key decisive decisions by Navarre and Cogny would doom the garrison. Many of their junior officers would perish in the opening hour of the siege.
Roy’s work has held well over time. He revealed the arrogance of French officers as the single most contributing factor to their defeat. This book is his chronological timeline of the battle.
Specifically on November 25th 1953, French intelligence reported to Cogny their radio intercepts revealed Ho Chi Minh ordering new battalions into the valley:
What he had to say struck him as exceptionally grave, and he accordingly refrained from any comment. During the night, his listening posts had intercepted the orders Giap had issued to the command posts of the 308th, 312th and 351st Divisions.
Pg. 58
Navarre and Cogny ignored repeated wire intercepts by French intelligence. These choices proved fatal to the garrison.
Tell the hard truth first
In conclusion, Christopher answers many unresolved questions regarding the French defeat. New documents reveal the path Ho Chi Minh and many Viet Minh leaders executed since 1945 to bring the Viet Minh to victory in the valley culminating in a decade long strategy. America ignored that a dedicated enemy could survive against the US effort already shaping up in South Vietnam.