When did America actually enter the Vietnam conflict? Churchill, America and Vietnam, 1941-45 by T.O. Smith details Churchill’s attempts to influence FDR to permit France to re-colonize Indochina before World War II. Yes before December 7th. FDR authored the US position of a trusteeship regarding Indochina. FDR’s policy intended to deny France their desire to re-enslave Indochina. Was the American nightmare for the faded glory of colonial empires?
Today it may seem surprising the future of Vietnam was debated between Churchill and FDR prior to the D-Day landings. This places a large part of their correspondence well into 1943. Ten years later the French would suffer defeat at Dien Bien Phu.
America would begin deploying troops a decade later. Smith’s previous book Britain and the Origins of the Vietnam War reveal how Churchill’s desire to expand their empire would entangle France and America across Indochina.
Smith has drawn upon papers from academic studies of Britain and France along with US Presidential libraries. On the surface many point to the Kennedy order placing American troops into Vietnam in 1963. Smith shows how this timeline is backed up to the mid 1940s. The US role is more accurately triggered to the 1954 Geneva Conference following the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. Formally US Secretary of State Dulles would return to brief Congress that America would pickup where the French left off to preserve democracy by military means.
Smith reveals that general discussions with Churchill regarding French desires in Indochina actually began before America entered the war:
The final declaration contained a lot of new world language. It was almost Wilsonian in nature. It envisioned a world built upon harmony rather than the old world balance of power. It alluded to vague concepts of freedom, democracy, peace and security, sovereignty, equality, and collaboration. In addition it acted as a Trojan horse, paving the way for American access to colonial markets. This was an audacious statement. After all, the United States had not yet officially entered the war. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor did not take place until four months later.
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The trigger point was the French collaboration with both Germany and Japan during the war, and as both Churchill and FDR would indicate the shallow efforts of de Gaulle, to imagine France was a world power. Yet as the U.S. was planning D-Day landings with the Allies, Churchill continued to lock FDR’s support for France’s desire to recolonize Indochina.
During the second World War, the seemingly innocuous and often neglected territory of French Indo-China was not only fundamental to Britain’s regional objectives within Southeast Asia but it was also crucial within the larger context of British imperial war aims, both for the war itself and for the configuration of the post-war world.
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The meetings and papers (by Smith) reveal a deep divide between how FDR saw the future world. Churchill and de Gaulle both viewed World War II as ultimately a war to expand their colonial empires. FDR also faced a State Department stacked with Francophiles. No surprise at his sudden death the State Department swung towards French re-colonization. America’s fate in Vietnam was sealed.
The second world war would be a time for seismic changes in the world order of the Allies:
Senior British officials continued to be under no illusions as to Roosevelt’s dangerous political motives. Charles Peake, Counsellor at the British Embassy in Washington, reiterated that the President was determined to ‘run the world’. Similarly the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Alan Brooke, foresaw that Roosevelt sought to use the war to break up the British Empire. However, Brooke also regarded Churchill as an equally ‘grave danger’.
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Another view reported by Smith:
A Memorial Day speech by Sumner Welles, Roosevelt’s close friend and confidant, had ominously declared that Allied victory would result in the death of imperialism and the liberation of all peoples…..The subsequent use of the term ‘partnership’ by Macmillan during a House of Commons speech symbolized not only Britain’s need to temper American criticism but also a genuine attempt at colonial readjustment that required social, economic and political progression…..On 15 June, Churchill flew to the United States for further discussions with Roosevelt. These were to take place at the President’s family home in Hyde Park, New York, and at the White House. Following the disappointments of early 1942, the nine-day whistle-stop tour was an attempt to rekindle personal relations and further co-ordinate war plans. It was Churchill’s third meeting with Roosevelt in ten months, but this time fate would not be kind to the Prime Minister. It was during the dialogue between Roosevelt and Churchill at the White House that the blow came. The Prime Minister was passed a note which stated that Tobruk had fallen to the German advance upon the Egyptian border. 33,000 men had been taken prisoner. After a substantial silence, Roosevelt’s response was both affectionate and genuine. The President asked Churchill how the United States could assist.
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And yet even in Britain the role of imperialism would not die out even in the face of Germany:
Eden not only faced opposition from Brooke. He also met with resistance to his post-war strategy from Clement Attlee, the Deputy Prime Minister. Attlee favoured the creation of an international system of colonial management. Eden was not against internationalised management systems. He wished to see defence and economic issues internationalised, but he believed that internal administration must be left to the colonial powers.
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Make no mistake that Roosevelt saw a vision for a new world order following World War II. Was joining the effort worth the cost? Probably if it meant he could destroy colonialism::
The reality was markedly different. The stage was thereby set for further conflict. The Americans had now experienced the wartime weaknesses and petty jealousies of old world colonialism. In early 1943 Roosevelt did not doubt that an Allied victory was ultimately possible. For this reason, the President began to ponder in earnest the price that he could extract from Britain for Churchill’s grand alliance. Britain was after all a vagrant. The Prime Minister’s dependence upon Roosevelt would give the President the leverage that he required for the pursuit of America’s broader war aims. These aims were naturally made in the American national interest. Roosevelt was, after all, a disciple of Wilson. The Atlantic Charter clearly demonstrated that the President sought to create a new international order based upon harmony, democracy and the end of old world empires. American values were being espoused for a new American-led world order. The failure of France, in particular, and the opportunity that this accorded played upon the President’s mind. Even before attending the Casablanca Conference, Roosevelt was showing his true colours. The President had already met with the American Joint Chiefs of Staff and expressed ‘grave doubts’ about restoring Indo-China to France after the war. Furthermore, Roosevelt had also pointed out to the Pacific War Council that Britain should refrain from making additional pledges about rejuvenating the French Empire. Based in Washington, the Pacific War Council was a favourable audience for Roosevelt’s Asian ideas – Australian, Canadian, Chinese, New Zealand and Philippine members could all be relied upon for affable support vis-à-vis British and Dutch representatives.
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In following Smith’s work it seems America via FDR was somewhat fighting Churchill and de Gaulle. And yet to cast a shadow onto Churchill’s light, the Foreign Office was also planning a future around Churchill’s back, as we have learned the US State Department was acting the same against FDR:
From Washington Halifax gaily noted the differences between Roosevelt and Churchill over the handling of the French. Roosevelt appeared to be entangled because of statements made by his diplomatic envoy to North Africa, Robert Murphy, promising the restoration of French territory. Churchill and the State Department had allowed themselves greater room for manoeuvre by making much more general pledges. But if Churchill believed that he was in the clear concerning such issues, another threat to his special relationship with Roosevelt was being conceived in Whitehall which, as yet unknown to him, would haunt Churchill in the months to come. Draft British plans for political warfare in Indo-China had been drawn up and approved by the Foreign Office…..On 4 February Halifax had the opportunity to question Hull regarding Roosevelt’s statement – made at the January meeting of the Allied Pacific War Council – not to restore the French Empire. Hull conceded, with embarrassment, that the State Department was unaware of Roosevelt’s commitments. Roosevelt could expect opposition from the British, but his erratic relationship with the State Department resulted in a State Department sub-committee delivering a thesis which concluded that a strong France would be required to achieve security stability in Europe…..The trusteeship debate spilt over into the press. An article in the The Times reiterated that the administration of British colonies was for Britain alone rather than jointly with the United States.
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One key issue FDR understood was the role the US commanded in war loans to both Britain and France. Roosevelt used this key leverage as a ramming stick to change the way European colonialism brought war to America and the world:
The question of Indo-China was revisited in Eden’s subsequent meet-ing with Welles and Roosevelt at the White House. Eden challenged that the President was being ‘very hard on the French’ who would no doubt strongly protest at such suggestions. Roosevelt had already foreseen such a charge and countered that ‘France would no doubt require assistance for which consideration might be the placing of certain parts of her territory at the disposal of the UN’. The inference was clear to all present – the United States as the main creditor to France at the end of the war would be able to enforce such a policy. At this point Roosevelt’s clear thinking was upset by both his and Murphy’s previous pronouncements. Welles reminded the President that the United States had already agreed to the restoration of French territory, but Roosevelt countered that this only applied to North Africa. Welles was adamant that this was not the case. But Roosevelt would not be moved, the actual details could be arranged ‘in the ironing out of things after the war’…..Eden was experienced enough not to be belittled by the Americans and wise enough to avoid jumping into the Roosevelt–Welles divide. The President may have been at odds with Welles over issues concerning French territory, but Roosevelt generally preferred to work through Welles rather than Hull. Eden knew how to play the American game. As part of his American excursion Eden endeared himself to his hosts with a speech to the Assembly of the State of Maryland. This called for the British Commonwealth to be a voluntary association and an instrument of development capable of moving members towards total independence. Eden dutifully kept Churchill abreast of his discussions in Washington. He wanted to co-ordinate British foreign policy and to create a better world. Hull had already spoken to Eden about the need for some kind of Anglo-American accord to solve world problems…..But Churchill was not best pleased with the news that he received from America, especially regarding post-war ideals, and he telephoned Cadogan at the Foreign Office to vent his annoyance…..Eden returned to Britain and reported the details of his discussions to the War Cabinet. He informed them that debates about French affairs were ‘of a somewhat varied nature’: Hull ‘clearly hated’ de Gaulle. Eden had received many complaints that the British ‘had not done enough to support the American point of view’. The United States was against the creation of a single French civil authority in exile to deal with French affairs and preferred to transact business with each rival French leader – Giraud and de Gaulle – separately. Roosevelt suspected that Britain only wished to resurrect France as a Great Power for selfish reasons whilst Leahy envisaged a malevolent British conspiracy to manipulate de Gaulle at American expense.
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Eden outlined his talks with Roosevelt to the Cabinet and referred to the conversation with Welles and the President about internationalising Indo-China. Eden believed that Welles’ reaction concerning guarantees to the French empire meant that this would not be pursued any further…..Winant, the American Ambassador to Britain, met with Cranborne to discuss the Anglo-American drafts of the joint colonial declaration. The main difference between the drafts was the American emphasis on the word ‘independence’ for the colonies. Cranborne believed strongly that such a word could not be included in any declaration. Colonies removed from British protection could fall under the influence of less experienced nations in such affairs – the United States. Winant proposed substituting independence for ‘social and economic development’. Cranborne was satisfied with the change in emphasis…..In Washington Churchill found both Roosevelt and Hull vehemently anti-de Gaulle, but this was the least of his current worries. The special relationship and post-war issues had to be attended to first.36 Churchill therefore set about grooming the Americans with gusto. On 22 May Churchill hosted a lunch at the British Embassy for a number of the senior members of Roosevelt’s administration – Vice-President Henry Wallace, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, Secretary of War Stimson, Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Thomas Connally and Welles. Churchill used the occasion to elaborate on his personal view of the post-war world. He envisaged the United States, the Soviet Union and the British Empire as the supreme powers responsible, to varying degrees, for three regional organisations. China would be pronounced a Great Power, but not to the same degree as the supreme three. France would assist in the policing of Europe. The world security organisation that Churchill pictured did not exclude an Anglo-American special relationship. Churchill would have been pleased with the reception that his ideas received. Welles and Connally were in complete agreement. Connally even ventured to express that ‘the U.S. and England could run the world by themselves’. Churchill knew how to work his audience.
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The Americans believed that they were making progress with Churchill and vice-versa, although Brooke shrewdly noted that Churchill demonstrated a greater grasp of strategy than Roosevelt. Churchill returned to the subject of the post-war world two days later during an intimate luncheon at the White House with Roosevelt, Wallace, Hopkins and Lord Cherwell. This time he met with more opposition from Wallace who believed that an Anglo-American alliance was a crude post-war mechanism. Churchill, fuelled by whisky, frankly asserted ‘why be apologetic about Anglo-Saxon superiority . . . we are superior’…..In London, Eden and Attlee were fed up with Churchill’s ‘lecturing’ and ‘hectoring’ from Washington. Harvey noted that it was ‘high time the old man came home.
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Smith again finds both Churchill and FDR angry with the position by de Gaulle:
By this time Roosevelt had finally lost his patience with de Gaulle and was asking for his head on a platter. He subsequently went further and declared that there was no such place or entity as France. At the Allied Pacific War Council in Washington Roosevelt made strenuous remarks about Indo-China. The Foreign Office continued to monitor the political situation in the United States and in particular American attitudes towards imperialism…..However, the Foreign Office failed to comprehend that despite its often fanciful direction Roosevelt’s abundant anti-imperialism was not merely an electoral whim. In June 1943 Roosevelt even suggested that Australia should purchase Timor from Portugal – a neutral nation….The Foreign Office also had to contend with a lack of unity within Britain’s National Government. Churchill was in step with Roosevelt and against the immediate recognition of an Allied France. The Labour Party, however, was developing its own approach towards the issue of colonial development. The resultant policy statement advocated ‘responsible self-government’ for the colonies. On 13 July the Conservative minister Stanley gave the fullest expression to date of British colonial policy. In a speech to the House of Commons he said that ‘we are pledged to guide colonial people along the road to self-government within the framework of the British Empire’. The subsequent paper International Aspects of Colonial Policy was sent to the Dominion Governments. It considered the establishment of a regional commission for Southeast Asia. If the British were to retain their colonies in the Far East the French would be unlikely to accept anything less. Britain was weak. It could not stand alone and it was vulnerable to the demands of others. Any definitive policy would therefore need to be an imperial one agreed with the Dominions. The priority would be to protect the Commonwealth and the Empire in the Pacific. By its very nature this policy would have to involve the United States – a potential source of conflict. If American anti-imperialism in the Far East resulted in a weakening of France in Europe, then this would compromise stability much closer to home…..Churchill returned to the United States and dined at Roosevelt’s family home at Hyde Park on 14 August. In the privacy of Roosevelt’s home and in a relaxed and informal atmosphere Churchill articulated the need for a flexible post-war Anglo-American relationship rather than Roosevelt’s formal United Nations Organisation. Roosevelt had initially intended to tackle Churchill at Hyde Park about the post-war world. He still suspected that Britain was only acting out of self-interest. But he chose instead to respond to Churchill six days later when he outlined his proposal for a post-war security organisation to the Prime Minister. The Foreign Office feared that Roosevelt intended to use the Atlantic Charter as the blueprint for governing the post-war world. Even more worryingly it held that this blueprint was not ‘static’ and that Roosevelt intended that it was solely ‘for him to interpret and secure the realisation of this as and when appropriate’. This could involve the United States acquiring the port of Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam as an American naval base as part of any trusteeship settlement. Churchill had agreed to the Atlantic Charter in order to gain American support, but he had deliberately avoided framing a clear-cut British policy based around it. At the Quebec Conference in pursuance of his post-war agenda Roosevelt challenged Cadogan about the Charter: ‘Cadogan, I want to ask you a riddle – Where is the original Atlantic Charter?’ Cadogan did not hesitate to expose Roosevelt to the ruthless reality of British foreign policy: ‘That’s an easy one, Mr President; it doesn’t exist’.
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As the Allies war efforts continued and in the ramp up to the May 1943 Quebec Conference the US under FDR kept the messaging simple for the coming two months:
Following the Quebec Conference Roosevelt returned to Washington where he held lengthy talks with William Averell Harriman, his personal diplomatic representative, whom he was about to dispatch to Moscow to negotiate with Stalin. They touched on the substance of a post-war settlement and the future of France in greater detail. Despite Roosevelt and many in his inner circle expressing vehement disdain concerning France and imperialism in general, they were not unsympathetic to Britain’s vulnerabilities over colonial issues. Hull delivered a speech on 12 September in which he purposefully avoided the use of the word ‘independence’ but the subtext alluded to what might be achieved in the way of liberty.
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There has been much discussion by the US interests by Louis Mountbatten to conducting rouge negotiations with Chiang Kai-Shek. The role of British imperialism involved Mountbatten in his role of Supreme Allied Commander in Southeast Asia.
Smith spends valuable time documenting how Mountbatten deceived FDR for the benefit of reviving the British empire interests across Southeast Asia and yet, how out-of-step Mountbatten was viewed by his contemporaries:
Mountbatten departed for SEAC in October to assume his new duties. The Foreign Office also dispatched Maberley Esler Dening to SEAC to advise Mountbatten on political issues and foreign affairs. This would involve co-ordinating policy amongst the Allies; giving specific advice concerning Siam, Indo-China and political warfare; and representing the Foreign Office to the New Delhi Commission. Upon arrival Mountbatten immediately discovered that ‘Anglo-American relations in this theatre were far and away the worst I have ever come across’. Stilwell, Mountbatten’s deputy, proved to be ‘entirely anti-British’….His Anglophobia was only equalled by his contempt for China whom he was also expected to serve. American personnel attached to SEAC quipped that it was an acronym for ‘Save England’s Asian Colonies’.
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Mountbatten sent a personal note to Roosevelt informing him of the outcome of his meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek. The outcome was con-firmed to Roosevelt by American Lt.-General Brehon Somervell who had also been present. Somervell had even helped to broker the Gentleman’s Agreement. Mountbatten’s personal correspondence to Roosevelt, however, merely informed him of an amiable meeting with Chiang Kai-Shek to remove distrust and barriers between the commands, but it did not specifically mention the Gentleman’s Agreement…..Roosevelt seemed pleased with both SEAC and its Supreme Allied Commander and expressed confidence in the resolution between the commands, a success that he personally accredited to Mountbatten; but had he, Churchill and Brooke been misled?…..Mountbatten informed the British COS of his proposals to Chiang Kai-Shek regarding both Indo-China and Siam. These proposals were in essence the substance of the Gentleman’s Agreement. But Chiang continued to express the impracticality of Indo-China and Siam being transferred to SEAC and jealously defended that political orchestration should be solely managed by China Theatre. This political dynamic was something that Mountbatten found detrimental to SEAC as he wanted to undertake pre-occupational duties independently of Chiang. Yet had he already actually committed himself to such a compromise? Field Marshall Sir John Dill, responsible for the British Joint Service Mis-sion in Washington, was under the impression that both Mountbatten and Roosevelt had agreed to political issues surrounding Indo-China and Siam being settled by a commission located at China Theatre Headquarters. The SEAC-China Theatre difficulties did not pass unnoticed by their Japanese adversaries. The Japanese had not been idle and used the inter-theatre complications for wartime propaganda, citing that Britain’s imperialist intention was to retain Indo-China and Siam after the war. Differences between Chiang Kai-Shek and Mountbatten over theatre boundaries, the ambiguities of the Gentleman’s Agreement and French participation in the war in the Far East would continue to reverberate in parallel to the trusteeship debate. These differences eventually culminated in an Allied crisis in the spring of 1945.
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In the meantime, if Churchill believed that he could direct the debate concerning the nature of Anglo-American post-war relations and the new world order, de Gaulle seemed determined to prove otherwise. He thrust the issue of Indo-China back into the foreground by establish-ing a committee to ponder the question of its status for the Allies. The Committee was also charged with considering the participation of French forces in the liberation of Indo-China. France may not have existed but de Gaulle was not going to abandon its most important colony. In order to facilitate such plans even further de Gaulle’s French National Liberation Committee asked for representation on the Allied Pacific War Council. This was the very body to whom Roosevelt had vented his desire not to restore the French Empire in January…..But the matter was raised again two days later in a meeting at the Foreign Office with Stanley Hornbeck, a political relations adviser at the State Department. Hornbeck argued that although the French representation on the Pacific War Council did have some advantages, including being able to refuse French military missions, it did not automatically qualify France the right to return to Indo-China. The United States was not fighting the war to return colonies to colonial powers but to defeat mutual enemies.
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In Washington however, Roosevelt persisted in developing his theme of trusteeship with Hull and Leahy. This would be not only for French Indo-China but also Hong Kong. Hull was sub-sequently dispatched to the Moscow Conference where he presented Roosevelt’s trusteeship ideas to the Russians. Roosevelt continued to believe that selfish British political motives were hampering his grand strategy. He was frustrated with the British attitude and vented his displeasure to the American Joint Chiefs of Staff on 15 November…..Continued American hostility towards the imperial powers and the restoration of their colonies led Cadogan to conclude that ‘there is much to be said for the colonial powers sticking together in the Far East’. Churchill had hoped to delay any decision, let alone action on the French participation in the war in the Far East, but de Gaulle was not prepared to stand on ceremony for the benefit of a British Prime Minister. With no response to their requests for representation forthcoming the French now asked for permission to send a military mission to SEAC. Cadogan used the opportunity to push Churchill into raising imperial interests above his relationship with Roosevelt.
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Churchill had in the meantime attended the Cairo and Tehran conferences where Roosevelt and Stalin had fundamentally changed the dynamics of the post-war Indo-Chinese debate…..Churchill was not aided by Roosevelt who had returned to the themes of his anti-colonial agenda from Casablanca. Macmillan witnessed the President ‘browbeat’ the Prime Minister yet again over France and Indo-China. Yet Roosevelt was also thrown off course by Chiang and the demands of his wife. The President’s assurance of Chinese member-ship of the Big Four along with vague references to trusteeship for Korea and Indo-China boosted Chiang’s morale. The first draft of the Cairo Declaration approved the restoration of Chinese territories but omitted reference to the restoration of the European colonies. Subsequent negotiations produced little fruit for the British. However, the revised final communiqué did state that all Japanese conquests should be relinquished – the post-war status of the Asian colonies was not mentioned.
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No sooner had the conference begun than Roosevelt and Stalin met for bilateral discussions without Churchill in the President’s quarters. The two leaders appeared to be getting on well together. Roosevelt in particular would have been pleased by Stalin’s willingness to engage in a discussion on his pet subjects – anti-imperialism and French Indo-China. Stalin talked at length on the problems of the French ruling classes and their collaboration with Nazi Germany. Roosevelt responded that although Churchill believed that France should be rehabilitated as a strong nation, he did not share this view. Roosevelt was hanging Churchill out to dry. Churchill the old imperialist was not even being consulted. Roosevelt and Stalin were setting an unpleasant agenda for the post-war world. Stalin naturally agreed with Roosevelt and went on to explain that French Indo-China should not be returned to France. If Stalin had intended this as a trap to open Roosevelt up to discussing global post-war issues, when the Soviet Union was only committed to fighting a European war and had not as yet declared war on Japan, then the bait was taken by the President.
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In Washington Hull proposed a joint Anglo-American declaration regarding colonial policy. The British Colonial Office was not enamoured with Hull’s initial draft which perceived deeper meaning into the murky substance of the Atlantic Charter. Particular concern was given to the proposed pledge that ‘peoples who aspire to independence shall be given an opportunity to acquire independent status’. Meanwhile the French National Committee of Liberation released a declaration in the name of de Gaulle publicising the political and economic development of Indo-China in a ‘free and intimate association’ with France.
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On this occasion Roosevelt revealed that:
He had been working very hard to prevent Indo-China being restored to France who during the last hundred years had done nothing for the Indo-Chinese people under their care. Latter were still as poor and as uneducated as they had ever been and this state of affairs could not be allowed to continue. He thought that Indo-Chinese who were not yet ready for elective institutions of their own should be placed under some United Nations trusteeship, which would take them toward the stage when they could govern themselves. The British representative duly telegraphed Eden who informed a convalescing Churchill of Roosevelt’s latest musings. Despite warnings to the contrary Churchill was dismissive of the brewing crisis. He had frequently heard Roosevelt’s deliberations on this issue but he had ‘never given any assent to them’. This was a matter for the end of the war. Churchill believed that the United States would not forcibly remove territory from France without making an agreement with a French government that had been freely elected by the French people, again a matter for the termination of the war or at the very least the liberation of France and the holding of free elections. Churchill was confident in his stance. Roosevelt had already made numerous declarations on ‘the integrity of the French Empire’, and the Prime Minister asked to see these. Eden, however, was not convinced that Roosevelt’s current attitude and endeavours should be so readily dismissed. He advised Churchill that a ‘note of caution’ should be sounded in Washington. He requested that Halifax meet with Hull to establish whether Roosevelt’s Indo-Chinese statements actually represented ‘a concerted White House-State Department policy’. Eden considered that it was very important for Britain to have a ‘definite policy on this matter’. The issue was becoming ever more complicated. It would be irresponsible to let it drift. The French remained eager to establish a military mission attached to SEAC and had already set one up in Chungking. The possibility of French troops and warships being used in the Far East was accelerating. Churchill agreed with Eden that Halifax should contact Hull, but he remained adamant in his belief that ‘questions of territorial transfer should be reserved until the end of the war’.
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Although Churchill was content to dismiss speculation over the future of French Indo-China, the Foreign Office was not. Cavendish Bentinck was one of a number of officials who were both highly suspicious and critical of Roosevelt’s trusteeship policy. Roosevelt was deluded as to the actual extent of his power and motivated not by benevolence but by ruthless dollar imperialism.
President Roosevelt is suffering from the same kind of megalomania which characterised the late President Wilson and Mr Lloyd George (the latter to a lesser extent) at the end of the last war and proved the former’s undoing. . . .I trust that we shall not allow ourselves to quarrel with the French, without being on very strong grounds, for the benefit of a United States President, who in a year’s time, may be merely a historical figure. If Indo-China is not restored to France on the ground that ‘the poor Indo-Chinese’ have had no education and no welfare (I have never heard that the Indo-Chinese were any more unhappy than the share croppers of the Southern United States), the Dutch and ourselves may later on be told that the oil resources of the Netherlands East Indies and Borneo have never been properly developed, nor the rubber resources of Malaya, that the natives are insufficiently educated according to Washington standards and that these territories must be placed under United Nations trusteeship (perhaps with United States oil and rubber controllers). The President’s double standards were all too evident to those in Whitehall. America, a segregated nation, was lecturing the colonial powers about welfare and development. The forthcoming American elections did at least provide the possibility of Roosevelt’s removal from office and the easing of Anglo-French relations – relations that were necessary for the long-term security of Europe.
Eden was troubled by the escalating Indo-Chinese crisis. Roosevelt’s policy seemed at best hazy.But in Churchill’s continued absence these ‘very big issues’ could not be considered by the War Cabinet. The only course of action for the moment was further discussion between the Foreign Secretary and his senior civil servants with a view to developing a uniform imperial policy with Australia, Canada and New Zealand. In the meantime if the French published Roosevelt’s previous pledges on the restoration of the French Empire the results would be ‘devastating’. The Foreign Office also remained suspicious of Chinese intentions towards French Indo-China, and it firmly believed that it was both irresponsible and impossible to prevent France from taking part in the war in the Far East. The French had an intimate knowledge of Indo-China, which both Britain and the United States did not, and a substantial number of troops and ships available in North Africa for any such campaign. A British response of ‘No thank you; we prefer to have more of our own soldiers killed’ in the Far East would require some kind of explanation to the British public. The Defence Committee had already decided that the French mission to SEAC should be dispatched as soon as possible. Its presence would help to limit ‘incidents’ with French troops on the Sino-Indo-Chinese border and also to provide valuable support to Mountbatten.
pgs.45-46
Britain’s official responses to the questions raised by Roosevelt’s policy of trusteeship, anti-imperialism and the possibility of French participation in the war in the Far East continued to vex officials in Whitehall. At the Foreign Office, Cadogan was aghast at the unprofessional fashion in which the President conducted intra-Allied business. A British rejoinder to Roosevelt’s Indo-Chinese questions was not aided by the deterioration in the relationship between Mountbatten and Stilwell within SEAC. The two commanders were never suited to get along at the best of times. Mountbatten was related to a number of European royal families – Edward VIII was the best man at his wedding. Stilwell was a hard-talking American anti-imperialist known as ‘vinegar Joe’. Their mutual distrust and animosity became symbolic of the Anglo-American war effort. Was America fighting for the return of European imperialism or was this a ruse to attain access to new markets and business opportunities? Trusteeship was certainly not without its financial benefits. The Foreign Office was against finding a local Southeast Asian solution to the Mountbatten–Stilwell dispute. It held that the source of all intra-Allied Indo-Chinese problems lay in Washington. Until this was addressed localised negotiations were unlikely to yield any positive results.
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The British reputation in Southeast Asia was hardly outstanding. It too had been damaged by its failure to withstand the Japanese advance into the region. Britain therefore began to initiate its own colonial development policy towards the region. Post-war constitutional change was explored for Malaya and Borneo. Political evolution was matched with planning for the post-war economic reorganisation and reconstruction of Malaya, Borneo, Hong Kong and the Pacific dependencies. All of these had fallen ingloriously into Japanese hands. Stanley, the Colonial Secretary, later argued – in November 1944 – that colonial development would keep the Commonwealth and the Empire in close contact with the metropole. This would enable Britain to continue to play a major role in world affairs, but it would do so under the guise of a very different imperial framework to the pre-war model. Eden was forced to approach Churchill again on 11 January 1944 concerning the future of French Indo-China. The Foreign Office had received a statement from the British Embassy in Chungking. This report strongly deplored Roosevelt’s stance concerning the future of French Indo-China. The severity of the assessment left Eden with little option but to forward the statement to the Prime Minister. The report specifically highlighted the danger of the Chinese agreeing with Roosevelt, therefore supporting America against France’s wish to return to French Indo-China after the war. The statement did not doubt that the Chinese hoped to put forward their own economic and political agenda for Indo-China under a Chinese-mandated trusteeship system rather than a United Nations administration. The account appeared to galvanise Churchill into action. Contrary to his previous tactic of dismissing Indo-Chinese questions out of hand, Churchill now decided that the Foreign Office should undertake ‘very strong’ consultations with the State Department.
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In the meantime Roosevelt, unhindered by State Department restraints, continued to pursue his utopian vision for Indo-China. On 18 January, Roosevelt held wide-ranging talks in Washington with Halifax over lunch. When the topic of conversation turned to the issue of Indo-China, Roosevelt was not at all embarrassed by his previous pronouncements. Halifax had already conferred with Hull, who had admitted to being kept in the dark by the President on this matter; he therefore considered that Roosevelt’s thoughts did not represent a ‘settled’ State Department policy. The President, however, jovially informed the British Ambassador that his expressions on this subject represented his ‘considered view’. Halifax cautioned Roosevelt that his lectures would be reported back to the French. But the President, who was enjoying sparring with Halifax, responded ‘I hope they will’. Roosevelt turned to the heart of his Indo-Chinese thoughts – the need to remove Indo-China from French control. Britain feared Chinese intentions towards Indo-China, but Roosevelt was not so concerned. He was ‘satisfied’ with Chiang Kai-Shek’s motivations. Roosevelt added to his main argument by revealing that Stalin liked the idea of placing Indo-China under some kind of ‘international trusteeship’. His thesis was that Chiang Kai-Shek could be trusted: Stalin was in full support but Roosevelt feared that the real problem was Churchill. The President emphasised that he had mentioned it ‘25 times’ to Churchill; however ‘the Prime Minister has never said anything’. Roosevelt appeared to have turned the tables on the British. His was the predominant view between the four Great Powers. Britain was isolated and the Prime Minister was incommunicado on this subject. Was this an example of dextrous verbal sparring between Roosevelt and Halifax? If so, Roosevelt had just revealed Britain’s vulnerability as a Great Power to American dominance.
Pg. 50
Roosevelt was keen to demonstrate to Halifax the clarity of his ‘considered’ thinking. He denied that his previous ‘pledges’ about the veracity and the standing of the French Empire were either contrary or relevant to his current plans…..Halifax countered that the Allies needed to restore France as a Great Power rather than create division and resentment in any future world order. Could not the President at least consider the proposals of the British Colonial Secretary, Stanley, of regional councils to administer trusteeship issues? But Roosevelt was in too playful a mood to take the idea seriously. He did agree about the ‘general future of France’ but on the specific topic of trusteeship he was prepared to be ruthless: ‘tell Winston I gained or got three votes to his one as we stand today’ – China, the Soviet Union and the United States versus Britain.
Pg. 51
Meanwhile, Roosevelt wrote to Hull to reaffirm his trusteeship policy: ‘France has had the country – thirty million inhabitants for nearly one hundred years, and the people are worse off than they were at the beginning’. The President saw ‘no reason to play with the British Foreign Office in this matter’. He was absolutely resolute, ‘France has milked it for one hundred years. The people of Indo-China are entitled to something better than that’. Halifax’s concern about Roosevelt’s trusteeship intentions appeared justified. At a press conference in Washington, several days after the President’s reassurances towards the British Ambassador concerning British decolonisation, Roosevelt turned his anti-colonial wrath upon the nature of the British Empire. Britain was charged with the same crime of under-development in the Gambia as the French had been in Indo-China. Britain had exploited the indigenous people for economic gain. A United Nations committee should be sent to investigate. Conference which had rejected post-war self-government for the French colonies. The stage was set for conflict. Allied unity was subservient to Roosevelt’s war aims, and Roosevelt’s justification for trusteeship of French Indo-China set a dangerous precedent for Britain. The Australian and New Zealand Governments held a joint conference in Australia to debate common regional concerns. Peter Fraser, the New Zealand Prime Minister, announced that he wished to see the Atlantic Charter ‘implemented to the fullest’ extent. This certainly alarmed Whitehall. Australia and New Zealand appeared to be advocating support for trusteeship – independent of consultation from Britain.
Pgs. 52-53
Halifax visited Canada and in Toronto he gave a speech to the British Empire Club. The speech affirmed commonwealth unity to preserve Britain’s post-war position as the fourth Great Power. William Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister, was not pleased with Halifax’s oration. He interpreted the speech as promoting a London-centric post-war imperial policy. Neither was Eden satisfied. The Foreign Secretary attempted to restrict further outbursts by requesting that all such engagements be cleared by the Foreign Office. However Lord Cranborne, the Dominions Secretary, revealed wider Whitehall divisions by agreeing with the speech. After all, a strong British Empire was vital to the post-war peace. Even Churchill expressed some sympathy towards Halifax.
Pg. 53
The Prime Minister informed the House of Commons that the forthcoming presidential election in the United States could revive the public prospects of American anti-imperial sentiment. He was not personally concerned by the shallow consequences of election dramas. But Churchill cautioned, ‘a lot of rough things will have to be said about Great Britain and popularity is to be gained in that large community in demonstrating Americanism in its highest forms’….The War Cabinet Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee concluded that British possessions in the Far East – Australia, India, New Zealand and territories in the South Pacific – were susceptible to the actions of a hostile power using Indo-China. The recent actions of the Japanese exemplified this hazard and justified this thesis. However, the paucity of Britain’s status as a Great Power was revealed in the analysis. The Committee highlighted that without American assistance Britain would be unable to address any future threat. Roosevelt’s deliberations over the future of French Indo-China were therefore paramount to the maintenance of Britain’s position within the region. Although Britain would welcome American involvement in the defence of Indo-China, if the United States removed Indo-China from French control the hostility and the resentment of the French would ‘seriously endanger’ any post-war collaboration. This would result in an ‘unfriendly’ relationship with France that could affect British security in other parts of the world. The Committee therefore recommended that American participation in the defence of Indo-China must be sought. However, rather than deprive France of its territory, American interest should be recognised by the institution of United Nations bases. Eden presented the Committee’s conclusions to the War Cabinet as part of a wider paper on Indo-China and French possessions in the Pacific. Eden pressed the Cabinet that this was not a future problem but one with grave immediate consequences concerning Britain’s relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation and Britain’s current political warfare activities in Southeast Asia. He concluded that if the Cabinet favoured continued French sovereignty – something which it would be impossible to deny – then the subject should be pursued with the Americans to pre-vent any future differences of opinion. The War Cabinet approved of Eden’s paper on 24 February 1944. British policy would be to pursue the maintenance of French sovereignty over Indo-China subject to the establishment of international bases which would help to protect British interests in the region. Britain would also liaise with the Dominions Governments concerning the establishment of a co-ordinated policy vis-à-vis the Americans. Churchill, however, was not going to be bullied into taking any necessary action by the War Cabinet – led by the Foreign Secretary or the Dominions Secretary. His prime concern was to protect his special relationship with the President. A special relationship that was vulnerable to American sensitivities concerning European imperialism and war aims. Churchill feared raising Indo-Chinese matters with his American partner during a presidential election year lest Roosevelt seize upon them and use them to play to anti-imperial sections in the American press and electorate. Churchill therefore held the trusteeship debate to be of minor significance compared to the continuation of the Anglo-American special relationship for Allied wartime and post-war co-operation. Churchill was prepared to hide from the earnestness and seriousness of Roosevelt’s intent.
Pgs. 54-55
Australia informed Hull that it was entirely in favour of a French return to Indo-China. Churchill may have been reluctant to defend French imperialism in the Far East vis-à-vis his special relation-ship with America, but when Roosevelt’s chance remarks were directed towards the future of the British Empire Churchill was not as disinclined to offer a strong defence: ‘my irrevocable principle is that no Government of which I am the Head will yield one square inch of British territory or British rights in any quarter of the globe except for greater advantages or moral scruples’….The Colonial Secretary, Stanley, noted with disquiet the American hypocrisy concerning the creation of a benevolent trusteeship and its undoubted economic benefit to the advancement of the American market empire. The Foreign Office was aware of the growing global mercantile rivalry between Britain and the United States, and the para-dox that Britain’s continued Great Power status was dependent upon Anglo-American co-operation. The United States was ‘a land looking for opportunity’, and overseas oil, rubber, tin, communications and civil aviation industries were suitable economic targets for acquisition. The Indo-Chinese rubber industry would, no doubt, be of commercial interest to American manufacturers. By challenging Roosevelt’s plans for Indo-Chinese trusteeship, the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office were defending the European colonial empires against the onslaught of dollar imperialism. The economic nature of trusteeship was hidden beneath eloquent American language that advocated ‘a responsibility . . .to dependent peoples who aspire to liberty’. The United States was relatively untarnished in this respect – America led the way with its promise of independence to the Philippines following the war. In contrast Churchill’s predictions about the presidential election had come true: Britain was viewed by the American public as exploitative towards its colonies and preventative of self-government. Nonetheless, Foreign Office intransigence proved that, despite Churchill, Britain still had an independent foreign policy and that it was still a world power. Churchill had to tread carefully to protect his special relationship with Roosevelt against American public opinion and the British Whitehall establishment.
Pg. 56
Although Eden did recognise that the Prime Minister did not appear to want to discuss the future of Indo-China with Roosevelt, Indo-Chinese problems were now disrupting military operations rather than political deliberations. Action was needed. Yet Churchill remained indifferent towards the petition. His anger at again being dragged into Indo-Chinese deliberations was evident. He ridiculed Eden: It is hard enough to get along in SEAC when we virtually have only the Americans to deal with. The more the French can get their finger into the pie, the more trouble they will make in order to show they are not humiliated in any way by the events through which they have passed. You will have de Gaullist intrigues there just as you now have in Syria and the Lebanon. Before we could bring the French officially into the Indo-China area, we should have to settle with President Roosevelt. He has been more outspoken to me on that subject than any other colonial matter, and I imagine it is one of his principal war aims to liberate Indo-China from France. Whenever he has raised it, I have repeatedly reminded him of his pledges about the integrity of the French Empire and have reserved our position. Do you really want to go and stir all this up at such a time as this? I do not like the idea of Mountbatten’s command becoming a kind of minor court with many powers having a delegation there. The fact that the Dutch have a section is because we are studying those countries which they own with a view to attack and we certainly have no plans in prospect for liberating Indo-China. On the other hand, I recognise that the arrival of the ‘Richlieu’ (for 3 months) in Indian waters gives the French certain valid grounds . . .It is erroneous to suppose that one must always be doing some-thing. The greatest service SOE can render us is to select with great discrimination their areas and occasions of intervention…..Churchill could not have been less ambiguous concerning his fear. He had elevated trusteeship from a ‘chance remark’ to one of Roosevelt’s ‘principal war aims’. The most important aspect of Churchill’s wartime policy was his special relationship with America and this in itself was difficult enough to manage without the complications of French or Indo-Chinese issues.
Pg. 58Churchill’s delaying tactic was not well received by the Foreign Office. Harvey dryly observed that the ‘President has become more and more obstructive in all French matters and the Prime Minister runs away from them’. Cadogan was less sympathetic: ‘It’s a girls’ school. Roosevelt, P.M. and – it must be said de Gaulle – all behave like girls approaching the age of puberty’.
Pg. 59De Gaulle, in Washington, announced that France would not give up its empire. Meanwhile, by coincidence, the French delegation in Washington had acquired correspondence between Welles and Vichy. This urged that French Indo-China make every assistance available towards the Japanese in Indo-China.
Pg.60The COS may have decided that it was convenient to defer to Churchill’s direction on Indo-Chinese matters, but other branches of the British Government were less than happy with Roosevelt’s pronouncements or Churchill’s inactivity. Brendon Bracken, the Minister of Information, was particularly scathing about Roosevelt: ‘Now that Roosevelt is talking to God he may be even more unreasonable. We have got to tell the gentleman that Europe cannot be wrecked by his Dutch obstinacy’.69 Even Churchill was capable of making mirth at Roosevelt’s expense: ‘I think it would be a good thing to let the President know the kind of way de Gaulle interprets friendliness. I have now had four years’ experience of him, and it is always the same’. Roosevelt would have agreed: ‘Prima Donnas do not change their spots’. American reluctance to agree to the return of French overseas possessions had already led to disagreements between the President and de Gaulle. Churchill also had his difficulties with de Gaulle; however, with D-day on the horizon Bracken believed that Churchill was becoming more level-headed about French affairs. Nevertheless, Churchill could be as difficult as his French nemesis and continued to harangue both British and French representatives with Churchillian eruptions when particularly vexed. The British Ambassador to France, Duff Cooper, was an extreme Francophile and his pro-de Gaulle stance provoked Churchill to quip that Cooper was ‘a cat purring at the feet of de Gaulle’ but that Churchill had never actually met a ‘decent’ Frenchman.
Pg.60De Gaulle, in Washington, announced that France would not give up its empire. Meanwhile, by coincidence, the French delegation in Washington had acquired correspondence between Welles and Vichy. This urged that French Indo-China make every assistance available towards the Japanese in Indo-China.
Pg.60A new idea concerning ‘voluntary’ trusteeship was proposed. But it was ruled that this could not be discussed by the conference – further analysis was pending. John Curtin, the Australian Prime Minister, warned Churchill of the potential public relations disaster if America won the war in the Far East and recovered captured territories ‘relatively’ unaided by the other Allies. This would irrevocably damage Britain’s presence in the Pacific. The Foreign Office proposed making another appeal for the Prime Minister to consult with the Dominions. Eden cautioned that the Foreign Office needed to discover what had actually taken place at Quebec before proceeding.
Pg. 65The French still anticipated formal Allied permission to deploy their forces in the war against Japan. In contrast to the agreement attained in August, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff now reflected the attitude of their Commander in Chief and appeared indifferent towards the appeals of the British COS to decide the matter. The only solution appeared to be for Churchill and Roosevelt to come to some kind of workable solution for all of the parties concerned. On the other hand, it was in neither of their interests to agree to a conference, the deadlock served to shield their respective agendas. Nevertheless, Churchill at last appeared willing to consult with both Eden and Mountbatten at Cairo, at the end of October, concerning a possible settlement. Yet aware of the strength of Roosevelt’s convictions and jealous about guarding his special relationship, Churchill continued to hesitate about pursuing the subject directly with the President. He was caught in two minds about how to proceed. Churchill instructed Eden to ‘draft a telegram to the President’ but advised that this should be undertaken at the Foreign Secretary’s ‘leisure’. The draft would have to be agreed by the Prime Minister and he was in the short term unprepared to do so. Safety appeared to necessitate delay. Churchill counselled Eden that the President would not be fond of the French being permitted to partake in Indo-Chinese affairs. It seemed logical to the Prime Minister that ‘we had better keep this particular item till other more urgent matters have been settled’. After all, the war in Southeast Asia was unlikely to progress before 1946. Churchill timidly contested: ‘I am trying to improve on this’.
Pressure was building in Whitehall against the Prime Minister. At the Foreign Office Sterndale Bennett informed Pierson Dixon, Eden’s Principal Private Secretary, that there was a real danger of all Indo-Chinese operations being entirely managed by the United States unless urgent action was taken.
Pgs. 66-67The debate moved to Cairo where Mountbatten joined Churchill and Eden for discussions. He too pressed Churchill for a verdict and offered the Prime Minister the benefit of his expertise. Whilst Churchill was in Cairo the American Government’s decision to recognise the Provisional Government of France was announced. Mountbatten’s enthusiasm that this necessitated full recognition of the Blaizot mission was for the moment both premature and erroneous. Churchill and Roosevelt had not reached a mutual agreement.
Pg. 67In the meantime, the French resolved to take matters into their own hands and settle the issue of their Far Eastern involvement for them-selves. In September, Vice-Admiral Fenard approached the Commander in Chief of the American Fleet and enquired whether the French Navy could be supplied with an aircraft carrier to conduct operations off the Indo-Chinese coast. The request was forwarded to the CCS for their consideration. When the matter eventually reached Churchill three months later, the Prime Minister was reluctant to act. Churchill may have been willing to support the ambiguous attachment of a French military mission to SEAC, but he was unprepared to permit France to develop the capacity to conduct its own operations in the South China Sea. Churchill blamed the strain of ‘heavy work’ for his inability to con-sider the request with the due care and diligence that it deserved. He therefore asked for the subject to be returned to on a later and more appropriate occasion.
Pg. 68The United States was just as unwilling to support the deployment of French forces in the Far East. It appeared to the British Joint Service Mis-sion in Washington that familiar political as well as naval deliberations were influencing an American response. In London, the First Sea Lord held that the Americans were ‘studiously avoiding any definite commitment’. If the French wished to pursue the prospect of their naval forces operating off the Indo-Chinese coast as part of Allied Far Eastern operations, then the British Admiralty held that it might just be able to aid its French counterparts with the renovation and refurbishment of French naval vessels.
Pg. 68At the same time as Churchill’s deliberations concerning the French fleet, stories circulated in Washington concerning Mountbatten’s future as the Supreme Allied Commander of SEAC. His intended demise was due to his tempestuous dealings with an unspecified American general. Mountbatten had already had a turbulent association with Stilwell, his deputy. Stilwell had been recalled to Washington in October and his position was taken by Al Wedemeyer – another American general but one who had previously maintained amicable relations with Mountbatten as his Deputy Chief of Staff. Wedemeyer, however, now considered it his duty as Chief of Staff to Chaing Kai-Shek to pro-tect China Theatre affairs at the expense of SEAC. M. Francfort, of the French Embassy in London, protested to Sterndale Bennett about Wedemeyer’s pronouncement that French Indo-China was located within the China Theatre. Mountbatten considered that the SEAC– China Theatre boundaries remained unresolved considering French Indo-China, an issue that he had not discussed at Cairo with Eden or Churchill. The first Quebec Conference had placed Indo-China within the China Theatre and Siam within SEAC. These boundaries were at odds with Mountbatten’s later Gentleman’s Agreement with Chiang Kai-Shek. Mountbatten now audaciously asked for clarification to the problem that he had helped to create. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff had already re-clarified that Indo-China lay within China Theatre boundaries, any change would be taken after a successful invasion. The haphazard nature of Mountbatten’s command did not pass unnoticed in London. Brooke and even Churchill remained wary of Mountbatten’s capacity to manage SEAC responsibly. Mountbatten was ‘quite irresponsible, and tries to be loved by all, which won’t at all work! . . . I [Brooke] am afraid however that Mountbatten will be a constant source of trouble to us and will never really fit the bill as Supreme Commander’.
Brooke’s personal thoughts, penned in his diary, proved prophetic when in 1945 Mountbatten was at the centre of another Anglo-American crisis.
Pg.69Based upon the history of the Indo-Chinese debate Eden would have expected very little from the new initiative, but there was little harm in attempting to circumnavigate Churchill and Roosevelt’s obduracy and reassess the prevalent mood in Washington. To rein-force the enterprise the Foreign Office notified Winant, the American Ambassador in London:
It would be difficult to deny French participation in the liberation of Indo-China in light of the increasing strength of the French Government in world affairs, and that, unless a policy to be followed toward Indo-China is mutually agreed between our two governments, circumstances may arise at any moment which will place our two governments in a very awkward situation.
The warning proved far-sighted when in March 1945 the Japanese disposed of the Vichy regime in Indo-China and precipitated another crisis in the Anglo-American relationship concerning Indo-China. In Washington the State Department challenged Roosevelt to ascertain both clarity and direction regarding his Indo-Chinese policy. Roosevelt was forced to defend his trusteeship predilection. The President received timely support from Major-General Bill Donovan, Head of the Office for Strategic Services (the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency). Donovan’s analysis of Southeast Asia indicated that Britain, France and the Netherlands all intended to recolonise the region as soon as possible.
Pg. 71In the meantime, Oliver Stanley advised the War Cabinet Armistice and Post-War Committee that Southeast Asia was an ideal candidate for a regional commission. Churchill was vexed with the Committee and his response was draconian. He temporarily ‘banned’ the Commit-tee from meeting. Brooke visited Churchill on the morning of the 12 December 1944. He observed that the Prime Minister ‘was quite incapable of concentrating on anything but his breakfast and the Greek situation’. A meeting later the same day provoked further consternation from Brooke: ‘Quite impossible to get the P.M. to even begin to understand the importance of the principles involved. . . . He cannot understand a large strategical concept’. Brooke was depressed at his leader’s inability to focus on the important issues at hand. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff even considered his resignation.155 Attlee, the Deputy Prime Minister, in conjunction with Stanley prepared another paper for the War Cabinet to discuss on trusteeship. The paper was an attempt to prevent the United States from dictating both the agenda and the course of international trusteeship. The Cabinet met on 20 December to discuss the world organisation and territorial trustee-ships. Cadogan was appalled with both Churchill’s conduct and his management of the meeting: ‘A complete madhouse – P.M. knows nothing about it’. It was all ‘utterly futile’. Cadogan believed that the ageing Prime Minister was ‘failing’. Colville noted how the strain of maintaining the special relationship with America was placing an enormous amount of pressure upon Churchill. The Prime Minister’s paperwork was in a ‘frightful state’. He was tired and neglected complex issues of state.157 Indo-China was no exception. Nevertheless, the trusteeship dispute would not dissipate. Churchill, although an ardent advocate for the protection of the British, continued to neglect the direction of the international trusteeship debate. The Prime Minister enquired of Eden on New Year’s Eve, ‘How does this matter stand? There must be no question of our being hustled or seduced into declarations affecting British sovereignty in any of the Dominions or colonies. Pray remember my declaration against liquidating the British Empire’.
Pgs. 71 72But Churchill warned: ‘ “Hands off the British Empire” is our maxim and it must not be weakened or smirched to please sob-stuff mer-chants at home or foreigners of any hue’. Eden was equally emphatic in his response to Churchill: ‘we are anxious to persuade the Americans not to go in for half baked international [trusteeship] regimes’. The American hypocrisy was evident to both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. On the one hand the United States promoted trusteeship for French Indo-China based upon anti-imperialism, but on the other it expected to create its own colonial territories on similar security grounds to the British Empire. Churchill asked John Martin, his Private Secretary, to research the trusteeship issue for him and ascertain: ‘if we are really being jockeyed out or edged near the abyss’ by the Americans.
Pg. 72Martin’s reply insisted that there was no apparent danger to the British Empire. Eden and Stanley concurred. Dening warned that the logic of history dictated that the former colonial governments were the best ‘qualified’ to liberate Southeast Asia. To deny this qualification to French Indo-China would create ‘disorder’ and threaten regional stability.
Pg. 72The Foreign Office was exasperated by the American intransigence: ‘This throws us back to where we were before the [second] Quebec Conference. The President refuses to discuss Indo-China with anyone save the P.M. and when he meets the P.M. he does not mention it’.166 The Foreign Office was equally frustrated with American suspicions concerning the recovery of the British Empire and the American preoccupation with self-determination. From an American perspective ‘recovery’ could only be interpreted as an enslavement of ‘native peoples’. Several days later Halifax had the opportunity to question Roosevelt directly about pre-occupational activities in French Indo-China. He vented his disappointment with the President’s communiqué for further talks with Churchill, which was relayed via Stettinius. The President opened his response with a characteristic ‘tirade’ about the status of French Indo-China. Halifax pressed Roosevelt for a ruling that would alleviate Mountbatten’s strategic concerns and end the current deadlock. The President chose to respond with both clarity and ambiguity:
if we felt it important we had better tell Mountbatten to do it and ask no questions. He did not want in any way to appear to be committed to anything that would seem to prejudge [a] political decision about Indo-China [that was] in a sense favourable to [the] restoration [of the] French status quo ante which he did not wish to see restored.
Pg. 73Roosevelt had not softened his stance towards French Indo-China, although he still regarded the details of how trusteeship would be both implemented and operated as purely a post-war concern.
Stanley, visiting Washington for Anglo-American negotiations concerning dependent territories, had an audience with the President. Roosevelt confirmed his intention to place French Indo-China under trusteeship and urged Britain to commit itself to a clear programme for decolonisation. The President playfully asked the Colonial Secretary whether Britain had ‘purchased’ Hong Kong in 1841. This was a blatant attack on European imperialism. Stanley was equally ruthless in his response. He cited that the episode in question occurred at a similar time to the Mexican War. America could be accused also of the evils of imperialism.
Pg.74Eden continued to try and produce a coherent direction for British foreign policy that would protect Britain’s national interests. Part of this policy was to restore France to a position of strength within Europe and therefore, by association, re-establish the French Empire. Paris had been liberated in 1944 and the de Gaulle administration had been recognised by the Allies as the legitimate Provisional Government of France in October 1944. It was intended for France to be rejuvenated as a Great Power. France was already a member of the Allied European Advisory Commission. The Allies had by now agreed that France would also administer one of the post-war occupation zones within Germany. Similarly, France would have to hold one permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Therefore it appeared logical to Eden that de Gaulle should attend the forthcoming Allied conference at Yalta in February 1945. Yet Churchill remained sceptical about post-war planning issues. He believed that too much effort could be expended in this direction.
Pg.75But the President was also contemplating that France would not be responsible for New Caledonia’s post-war defence. The Joint Planning Staff believed that Britain was being tested by Roosevelt. The President was considering what he could get away with regarding decolonisation.
Pg.76Churchill was unconvinced with Eden’s arguments regarding France and post-hostilities planning. The Prime Minister believed that France, no doubt, would be useful in the future. Eventually it would be rehabilitated as a Great Power but not yet; for the moment the Prime Minister was unconvinced that de Gaulle should be called to attend a meeting of the Big Three. Roosevelt’s views about de Gaulle were widely known, and Churchill feared that the presence of de Gaulle would quickly shake Allied unity and dissolve the conference proceedings into a farce: ‘we shall have the greatest trouble with de Gaulle, who will be forever intriguing and playing two off against a third’.
Pg.76Churchill was clear. France had not yet completed its prescribed restorative treatment: ‘France has enough to do this winter and spring in trying to keep body and soul together’. It could not ‘masquerade’ as a Great Power merely to remove its war guilt and balance out its earlier capitulations to Germany and Japan. Churchill regarded the prospect of having to deal with de Gaulle in such circumstances as wearisome. France was ripe for restoration but de Gaulle was not. The Prime Minister protested to Eden that his was a personal quarrel with de Gaulle rather than a general slur against France because the French general posed a significant danger to Allied unity. Churchill enjoyed his personal tirade against de Gaulle:
I cannot think of anything more unpleasant and impossible than having this menacing and hostile man in our midst, always trying to make himself a reputation in France by claiming a position far above what France occupies, and making faces at the allies who are doing the work.
Eden begged the Prime Minister to reconsider his stance. He demonstrated that the Prime Minister’s attitude could turn France towards Russia for assistance. After all, De Gaulle was not beyond such behaviour if he believed that he had been personally snubbed. The prospect of a Franco-Russian alliance concerning post-war co-operation posed serious problems for British security in Europe and elsewhere. Churchill was not persuaded by Eden’s conjectures.5 It was hard enough for the Prime Minister to maintain Great Power unity without de Gaulle being part of the equation. Besides, the threat of a potential post-war crisis did not constitute an effective counterweight to actual wartime politics. Churchill would not back down.
Pgs. 76-77Churchill and Roosevelt travelled on from Malta to Yalta to meet with Stalin. It was the first time that all three had been together since the Tehran Conference of November 1943. The journey to the Crimea town of Yalta, located north of the Black Sea in the Ukraine, was a long and tiring one for both Churchill and Roosevelt – and it clearly took its toll on the President’s health. Eden believed that despite the President’s obvious frailty this did not effect Roosevelt’s judgement. But Cadogan disagreed: ‘most of the time he [Roosevelt] hardly knew what it [the conference] was about’. Roosevelt was not above admitting his physical frailty. On one occasion he quipped: ‘Yes, I’m tired – and so would you be if you’d spent five years pushing Winston uphill in a wheelbarrow’.
Pg.78The conference agenda was therefore to put down the foundation stone for the shape of the post-war world. Roosevelt’s dislike of colonialism was evident at Yalta. Eden sardonically noted that Roosevelt’s ‘principled’ agenda permitted former colonies to become politically and economically subservient to the United States.15 Within this context Roosevelt’s suggestion for United Nations trusteeships was examined by the Big Three, but Churchill vetoed the President’s proposals. Eden described Churchill’s defence as ‘eloquent’ but Moran, Churchill’s physician, witnessed a great deal of ‘histrionics’ and shouting by the Prime Minister. Nevertheless Churchill was adamant. He was opposed to ‘such a departure which might well be pressed upon nations like Britain, France, Holland and Belgium who have had great colonial possessions by the United States, Russia and China who have none’.
Pg.78Churchill’s bold threat was evident to all present. The Prime Minister would not permit trusteeship to establish a precedent for decolonisation. Churchill feared that Roosevelt’s proposal was a Trojan horse designed to acquire property, by false pretences, by nations which currently did not posses access to such territories. The Prime Minister had, in a simple veto, aligned himself with the British Foreign Office, the Dominions and the other imperial nations against Roosevelt and Stalin. It was an important watershed in Anglo-American relations. Churchill had acted unilaterally and decisively against Roosevelt to protect not just the British Empire but all European colonies. Churchill had placed British foreign policy above his special relationship with Roosevelt, a path that previously he had feared to tread
Pg. 78Churchill and Eden fought also at Yalta for the full restoration of France but Roosevelt was not interested in Europe or achieving a balance of power. The President favoured the creation of a new world order with peace and security guaranteed by Britain, China, Russia, the United States and the United Nations organisation
Pgs. 78-79Yet Roosevelt took great interest in the military situation within Indo-China. The President regularly received ‘Magic’ decryptions of Japanese signals intelligence – his interest heightened by dreams of trusteeship.
Pg. 79Roosevelt had already met with Stalin in private prior to Churchill’s act of veto and discussed trusteeship in greater detail. Roosevelt told Stalin that he was not prepared to let Britain participate in the trusteeship scheme for Korea. Stalin recognised the danger to Allied unity of Churchill’s exclusion. Stalin replied that Churchill would certainly ‘kill us’ and he therefore advocated that the Prime Minister should be invited to participate in such a plan. The President went on to high-light to Stalin the danger for Britain of a precedent for decolonisation being established via his trusteeship proposals. Stalin was prepared to participate in Roosevelt’s decolonisation deliberations. He was not convinced that Britain was, in fact, the correct nation to oversee Burma. Roosevelt placed the plight of the Burmese, the Indo-Chinese and the Javanese together. They were all in need of assistance. Roosevelt revealed that de Gaulle had already requested that America supply a number of ships to France in order to facilitate a return to Indo-China. Stalin enquired as to how the President had left this appeal by de Gaulle. Roosevelt answered: ‘de Gaulle said he was going to find the troops when the President could find the ships’. But Roosevelt playfully added that he had not been able to locate any vessels. Stalin was still not yet committed to the war in the Far East. Both Britain and France relied upon American patronage to maintain the operational status of their armed forces. Roosevelt could easily refuse logistical aid to de Gaulle, and thereby prevent a French return to Indo-China and maintain the direction of his Indo-Chinese policies
Pg.80At a press conference aboard the USS Quincy following the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt had a ‘personal talk’ with members of the media concerning trusteeship. The President informed them that for the past two years he had been deeply troubled about Indo-China. Chiang Kai-Shek had revealed to Roosevelt that France had underdeveloped Indo-China and economically drained the region for its own benefit. The President explained to the assembled journalists how an international trusteeship committee – comprising of one French, one or two Indo-Chinese, one Chinese, one Russian and possibly one American and one Filipino representative – should be established to ‘educate’ Indo-China for self-government in the same way as the United States had prepared the Philippines for independence. But it had transpired in discussions that the difficulty in implementing such a solution lay with Britain: ‘Stalin liked the idea. China liked the idea. The British don’t like it. It might bust up their empire, because if the Indo-Chinese were to work together and eventually get their independence, the Burmese might do the same thing to England
Pgs.79-80Roosevelt understood that his utopian vision set a precedent for decolonisation and provided a focal point for Asian nationalism vis-à-vis European colonialism. Twice the President reiterated to his journalistic audience that trusteeship would make the British ‘mad’. Roosevelt concluded that it was ‘better to keep quiet just now’. One journalist fell into the President’s snare. Roosevelt was asked if Churchill expected that all areas of the world would be returned to the pre-war status quo. The implication in the question was that the United States was only fighting the war in order to restore European colonialism. Roosevelt responded with a perfect media sound byte: ‘Yes, he [Churchill] is mid-Victorian on all things like that’. Churchill was a product of the Victorian age but the President had just labelled him in American eyes as an imperialist of the worst kind.
Pg.80Dening wrestled also with the general French attitude towards the return of Indo-China. He was convinced that France intended for Britain to restore French Indo-China at any cost. He enquired curiously of Sterndale Bennett, ‘Do they expect us to bear their cross for them?’ The French attached to SEAC appeared to display the same negative traits that Churchill feared that de Gaulle would have brought to the Yalta Conference – if he had been invited. Dening concluded: ‘I am gradually gaining the impression that the French we have [here] are either mal élèves or just stupid, or trying to pull a fast one’. The stage was set for further high policy conflict.
Pg.80The relationship between Mountbatten and Wedemeyer was also clouded by their relationships with Chiang Kai-Shek. Despite previous guarantees to Britain that China possessed no imperial aspirations towards Indo-China – and in particular the northern Vietnamese province of Tonkin – Chiang Kai-Shek was not adverse to enlarging his area of influence or expanding Chinese territory. Chiang Kai-Shek, therefore, added to the Mountbatten–Wedemeyer and Anglo-American misunderstandings in order to promote his own interests. He often told both Mountbatten and Wedemeyer completely contradictory stories in order to confuse and divide the Allied commanders.
Pg. 82The escalating disagreement was made even more problematic when two British aircraft were shot down by American night fighters over Tonkin. SEAC had failed to alert China Theatre of their operations that night over northern Indo-China. The Allied deaths, caused by a lack of communication, were highly embarrassing to both SEAC and China Theatre, even though the British were ultimately more culpable than their American counterparts.British Air Vice-Marshal John Whitworth-Jones, on behalf of SEAC, acknowledged responsibility for the tragedy. He counselled that the investigation be stepped down and that a communications blanket be imposed to ensure that ‘sealed lips’ prevented any further news about the affair from leaking out.
Pg. 83Churchill may not have wished to push the President regarding French Indo-Chinese military matters at the Yalta Conference, but these matters were rapidly gathering a momentum of their own. The British War Cabinet COS Committee reassessed, in post-hostilities planning, the strategic significance of French Indo-China to British defence within Southeast Asia. It concluded that Indo-China was the single most important area within the region. Indo-China would become the vital ‘anchor’ for a chain of bases that would form a protective arch and cover Burma, Malaya and northern Borneo in order to shield wider British interests in Australia and India from future threats. The security of this chain of bases necessitated strong, stable and amiable governments in Indo-China and Siam, as well as unwavering support in Malaya. It also necessitated closer ties with France and Holland. If the Soviet Union did decide to establish a presence in the region – in particular within southern China – then Indo-China would become even more significant to protecting the British Empire. This would call for full Anglo-French-American-Commonwealth co-operation in maintaining Indo-China’s defence.
Pg. 84Wedemeyer was present in Washington at the same time as Hurley. Despite another bout of illness Roosevelt saw both Hurley and Wedemeyer separately. The President told them that he remained committed to independence for French Indo-China and instructed them not to supply French forces in the region. Therefore Roosevelt continued his campaign against French control of Indo-China. The British Colonial Secretary Stanley correctly gauged that trusteeship remained Roosevelt’s ultimate goal; his fears were confirmed by Halifax. Roosevelt envisaged that United Nations trusteeships would be set up at the San Francisco Conference. He needed the agreement of Britain and France for such schemes, but he was not yet ready to challenge them openly. The post-war world had not yet emerged and the Allied debt to the United States still had to be calculated. By June 1945 the British war debt would total 3355 million pounds, approximately a quarter of its national wealth. Britain needed the United States to be generous
Pg. 85The Foreign Secretary knew how to manipulate Churchill’s fears; it could be guaranteed that the Prime Minister would strive to protect his perceived special relationship with Roosevelt above everything else. Eden therefore argued that the Mountbatten–Wedemeyer disagreement would have a negative impact upon Anglo-American relations. It would produce ‘a constant source of friction’. The only recourse that Eden could envisage, to resolve the situation to a satisfactory degree, was for Churchill to make a direct appeal to Roosevelt. This was the very path that the Prime Minister feared to tread, but it was the route that he was now being asked to take. Eden believed that the solution to all of their problems in this dispute lay with Roosevelt. The President needed to formally endorse the Gentleman’s Agreement between Mountbatten and Chiang Kai-Shek as both the appropriate apparatus to administer the boundary between SEAC and China Theatre and as the justification for SEAC French Indo-Chinese operations. Under this arrangement, the local management of clandestine activities would be individually left to the respective Allied commander – Mountbatten or Wedemeyer. But the two commanders would be expected to exchange ‘intentions, plans and intelligence’ in all areas of joint concern…..In the meantime, Churchill appeared to fall for Eden’s bait. The Prime Minister hesitantly agreed to ‘consider an approach’ to the President…..Churchill was trapped. He needed to protect his special relationship with Roosevelt as this was the cornerstone of his wartime policies. This relationship had to be protected at all costs. The Mountbatten– Wedemeyer dispute threatened this relationship.
Pg. 86Churchill was desperately trying to balance his special relationship with Roosevelt against intra-Allied theatre conflicts and one of the President’s principal war aims – the removal of France from Indo-China. On 9 March another element was added into the Prime Minister’s complex equation. The Japanese launched their long suspected coup d’etat against the Vichy regime in Indo-China. The French authorities, who had previously been in charge of the government of the colony but under close Japanese supervision, were overwhelmed quickly and most French opposition crumbled…..The shackles of white colonialism were broken. The Vietnamese Emperor Bao Dai and the Cambodian King Norodom Sihanouk were permitted by the Japanese to proclaim their independence from French rule but remained within Japanese-governed ‘Greater East Asia’.
Pg. 87The following day, with French troops still engaged against Japanese forces deep within Japanese Greater Asia, French General de Saint Didier approached the British Joint Service Mission in Washington and urgently requested information on Japanese operations as well as immediate British assistance. At the same time, Churchill resolved to act. The grave situation within Indo-China and the unhelpful Mountbatten– Wedemeyer dispute necessitated decisive action. French troops could not be left unaided to suffer a forgotten defeat far behind enemy lines. Nevertheless, Churchill responded to the challenge ponderously. He contacted Ismay and requested that a brief be drawn up giving the history of proceedings within French Indo-China since the beginning of the Second World War. Churchill appeared vague and hesitant. The Prime Minister was unsure of the status of Indo-China. He was uncertain as to whether it was still a Vichy territory or a part of de Gaulle’s resurrected French Empire. Likewise Churchill was puzzled as to whether or not there actually were any French troops garrisoned there.
Pg. 88Churchill finally appeared to be galvanised into action on 17 March – five days later. Nonetheless his attention was not directed upon the immediate crisis within Indo-China and the need to assist French troops resisting the Japanese. The Prime Minister had instead decided at last to adopt a personal approach to Roosevelt concerning the Mountbatten– Wedemeyer dispute. Wedemeyer was at that moment in Washington for a number of policy briefings with the Roosevelt administration. The timing of Churchill’s approach appeared advantageous. The Prime Minister humbly reminded the President of Mountbatten’s claim and, using his personal friendship with Roosevelt as leverage, appealed to the President’s excellent nature to assist in rectifying the situation:
as you [Roosevelt] know he [Mountbatten] has an oral understanding with Chiang Kai-Shek that both he and the Generalissimo shall be free to attack Siam and Indo-China and that the boundaries of the two theatres shall be decided when the time comes in accordance with the progress made by their respective forces. The Generalissimo agreed after Sextant [the Cairo Conference] that this understanding extended to pre-occupational activities. I am told that Wedemeyer feels difficulty in recognizing this oral understanding in the absence of instructions to that effect from his superior authorities. This is a situation from which much harmful friction may spring. Could not you and I clear it up by jointly endorsing the oral understanding which seems a sensible and workable agreement?
Pg. 89In Southeast Asia, Mountbatten was delighted with the formal appointment of the French military mission to SEAC. Similarly, a message from Mountbatten to American Lt.-General Somervell mentioned that on a recent trip to Chungking Mountbatten was ‘delighted’ that the Gentleman’s Agreement was being ‘honoured’. Such remarks can only be described as curious given the context of the Mountbatten– Wedemeyer dispute. Mountbatten appeared undaunted by the political debate that raged around him. Ten days after the launch of the Japanese coup against the French in Indo-China Churchill turned his attention towards assisting the French resistance. Nevertheless, yet again, the problem of over-burdening his special relationship with Roosevelt prevented a direct approach to the President. Instead, Churchill told Wilson to inform Marshall that:
The Prime Minister feels that it would look very bad in history if we were to let the French force in Indo-China be cut to pieces by the Japanese through shortage of ammunition, if there is anything we can to do save them. He hopes therefore that we shall be agreed in not standing on punctilio in this emergency.
This was Churchill’s most robust and direct intervention yet on behalf of the French troops. The appeal to avoid an injustice necessitated an emergency response that rendered current disagreements irrelevant. Eden agreed with the Prime Minister’s approach to Marshall and urged for it to be dispatched immediately. At the same time the COS instructed Wilson to ask Marshall if it would be possible for Wedemeyer to send supplies to the French troops. The following day Churchill went even further. The Prime Minister charged Ismay that Mountbatten was to take ‘emergency action’ to aid the French troops. Churchill was not going to wait for a decision from Washington. His time for action had arrived; delay was not now an option. In Washington, Marshall met with Wilson for further talks. He revealed that Major-General Claire Chennault, the Head of the American Air Force in China Theatre, had been instructed to fly ordnance supplies to the besieged French troops. At the same time as the frantic high policy debate being waged between London and Washington, regional Allied commanders sought on their own initiative to assist the beleaguered French troops. With Wedemeyer in Washington, American Major-General Robert McClure had already ensured that the American Army Air Force assisted the French during the first week of the coup. American sorties were flown as a direct response to French requests for assistance. This was purely an emergency action as by 16 March the American Air Force had recommenced its regular bombing activities and would not assist in logistically aiding French troops without receiving authorisation from Washington.
Pg.89-90Small numbers of French troops continued to resist the might of the Japanese armed forces which had assumed control of most of Indo-China. On 22 March these diminutive French forces made another appeal for more equipment and the recommencement of logistical support by the American Air Force. The resistance within Indo-China was led by the French General Marcel Alessandri. He had organised an orderly retreat by French forces to Son La – located in the mountains of north-western Tonkin this was approximately half way between Hanoi (the provincial capital) and the Chinese border. Alessandri was not hopeful of his situation. He believed that Son La would fall to the Japanese within two days. However, Alessandri managed to rally his fatigued troops and successfully reinforced them with additional units who were fleeing towards the Chinese border. Five days after Alessandri’s initial assessment Son La was still held by the French. 4500 French troops occupied Son La and a further 2000 held the city of Luang Prabang in Laos. This prompted further French requests for finance and medical supplies to assist the beleaguered troops.
Pg. 92Roosevelt responded to Churchill’s appeal concerning the ongoing difficulties between Mountbatten and Wedemeyer. The President agreed that a mechanism needed to be established to empower total and truthful talks between the Allied commanders. However, his telegram to the Prime Minister requested that Churchill concur to ‘all Anglo-American-Chinese military operations in Indo-China, regardless of their nature be[ing] co-ordinated by General Wedemeyer’. Roosevelt had boldly proposed that Wedemeyer was to be the final arbitrator over Mountbatten’s clandestine operations. Marshall agreed with Roosevelt’s position, but he was unconvinced that Wedemeyer could actually direct Mountbatten’s deployments. The British Foreign Office regarded Wedemeyer’s position as nothing more than a ‘nominal co-ordinator’ with no power of actual veto over Mountbatten’s operations. It also insisted that the French should be involved in all future discussions. Hurley, in Washington, informed Wilson that American policy towards French Indo-China still remained rather ‘nebulous’. Despite Churchill’s triumph at Yalta, the spectres of trusteeship and anti-imperialism had not been exorcised from the Roosevelt administration. Hurley advised Wilson that Britain should expect further difficulties with both the President and the State Department concerning Hong Kong. Likewise, the administration was disconcerted that lend-lease equipment was being used for the recovery of colonies over and above the desire to propagate the war against Japan further….Hurley had been invited and had accepted the invitation to visit London on his return journey to Chungking. Churchill hoped that it would be possible for Hurley to call upon the Prime Minister. The visit was an ideal opportunity for the Foreign Office to assess Allied interests in the region from both American and Chinese perspectives. The Foreign Office placed a high degree of value on Hurley’s stopover and accordingly prepared a briefing paper. The briefing outlined Hurley’s personal views and opinions and detailed the best direction to be taken during his visit. The individual assessment of Hurley was not encouraging; it concluded that, although his ‘bark is probably worse than his bite’, he held the most ‘crude ideas’ about the nature of British imperial-ism. Hurley’s suspicions about European imperialism were well known within China Theatre. He had told the Dutch Ambassador to China bluntly that the United States was not about to rectify the wartime ‘mess’ for the return of British and Dutch imperialism in the Far East. Hurley was apprehensive of an Anglo-Dutch-French conspiracy that was designed to rejuvenate their imperial spheres of interest whilst at the same time keeping the Americans in the ‘dark’
Pgs. 92-93Mountbatten and Wedemeyer at last met to discuss their disagreement. The conference produced a full and frank exchange between the Allied commanders. Mountbatten repeated to Wedemeyer the legitimacy of SEAC operations within French Indo-China. This was based upon the endorsement of both the American Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President of the terms of the Gentleman’s Agreement. Mountbatten was not prepared to disavow his Indo-Chinese modus operandi. He submitted to Wedemeyer two documents for consideration during their talks. The papers proved Mountbatten’s assertion that he possessed American support at the highest levels for the terms of the Gentle-man’s Agreement. The mediation appeared to have the desired affect. Mountbatten and Wedemeyer agreed that in future Wedemeyer could only reject SEAC activities that clashed with China Theatre operations.
But Wedemeyer’s subsequent paper to Washington, about the confer-ence, added a further caveat. Wedemeyer claimed that British activities could not be performed until approval had also been given by Chiang Kai-Shek. The stage was therefore set for, yet again, further accusations and recriminations.
Pg. 95Churchill next embarked upon a firmer stand against his great American ally. The Prime Minister strongly warned Roosevelt that he could not permit any of Mountbatten’s operations within Indo-China to be subjected to Wedemeyer’s consent. He reiterated bluntly to the President his previous warning to Marshall: ‘it would look very bad in history if we failed to support isolated French forces . . . or if we excluded the French from participation in our councils as regards Indo-China’. Words that Churchill had not dared to communicate directly to Roosevelt during the previous month were now boldly sent to the White House. For the last two years Churchill had been trapped between the President and the British Foreign Office in an attempt to protect his highly romanticised special relationship. The Prime Minister had seen himself as the fulcrum attempting to balance the aspirations of two different and conflicting worldviews. But after months of delay and tactical manoeuvrings Churchill had returned to the fold. His telegram to Roosevelt clearly brought into line British military policy concern-ing Indo-China with his post-Yalta political stance on colonialism. Churchill had defended all of the colonial territories of all the European nations against the lustful intentions of the Americans, the Chinese and the Russians. From now on this applied in the military sphere just as much as the political. Alas Roosevelt did not have the chance to reply to Churchill’s watershed communication – he died the following day
Pg. 96America can trace the turmoil of not only Vietnam but the uproar of the 1960s and 1970s to this point in history. Roosevelt’s death truly marked the turning point that permitted America to walk into a nightmare as Francophiles within the State Department removed FDR’s idea of trusteeship as quickly as possible. I can only speculate that he did not groom Truman to carry forward his vision for the post World War II world reeling from unrest and nationalism throughout Southeast Asia. Truman was unaware of the atomic bomb project as well, so he was left out of FDR’s inner circle:
Roosevelt’s death was a significant turning point for American foreign policy. This had been the President’s sole preserve. American foreign policy had been robbed of its chief architect just as the European war drew to a close and the birth pains of a new word order commenced. This was even more the case for Indo-China than elsewhere. Roosevelt had made it one of his principal war aims to implement trusteeship and begin the process of decolonisation. Fate removed Roosevelt from the stage at precisely the moment at which he was needed most.
Pg. 96Truman attempted to follow in the footsteps of Roosevelt and approved of Wedemeyer’s stance. The new President told Churchill that Wedemeyer’s explanation offered the most ‘satisfactory method of solving the problem’. If future disagreement arose, Truman agreed with Churchill’s suggestion that it should be reported to the relevant Allied Chiefs of Staff for arbitration by the CCS. Truman addressed directly Churchill’s dark warning that history would judge the Allies harshly for not supporting the French troops fighting the Japanese. He revealed to the Prime Minister that Wedemeyer had already been ‘instructed to give the French resistance groups such assistance as is practicable without prejudice to his present or future operations’. It would, no doubt, be left for Wedemeyer to decide how he should best define words such as ‘practicable’ or ‘prejudice’, let alone ‘present or future operations’. Indecisiveness and ambiguity reigned. Churchill decided that Truman’s proposition appeared to offer a practical solution to their difficulties despite the limitations that Wedemeyer’s additional terms placed upon Mountbatten’s activities. Truman had agreed to relegate any future disagreements to the CCS and away from the political arena. Churchill was free now to groom the new President for another special relationship away from the potential political fallout resulting from a bitter Anglo-American intra-theatre dispute. Truman had also acted in the favour of the beleaguered French troops in Indo-China. Yet there was a familiar presidential silence concerning further French participation in the more general war in the Far East or Allied councils about Indo-China. Churchill was resigned to accept what he had been offered. He instructed Ismay for ‘Action this day’ on Truman’s telegram. Ismay duly referred the matter to the COS for their consideration. Four days later, Ismay was able to inform the Prime Minister that the COS had decided to trial the motion that Truman had suggested to Churchill. The following day Churchill informed Truman that Britain was prepared to attempt to undertake the President’s direction. The two heads of state had agreed that Mountbatten had the right to operate within French Indo-China In his reply to Truman, Churchill had not softened the terms of his complaint to Roosevelt from 11 April. Churchill had weighed the com-promises inherent in Truman’s resolution. The Prime Minister had not acted alone, he had sought the advice of the COS and his response to Truman was not a knee-jerk reaction but a considered stand developed over the course of six days. An ill-judged response could damage Anglo-American relations and set a disastrous tone for Churchill’s new special relationship with Truman. Therefore during this six-day pause Churchill had re-evaluated Anglo-American relations. The Prime Minister came to the conclusion that he had detected a subtle shift in the American political landscape. Churchill believed that the time was now ripe to discuss greater French and Dutch participation in the war against Japan with the Truman administration. Churchill told Eden of his conviction. The Foreign Secretary was in Washington, on behalf of the British Government, to attend Roosevelt’s funeral. Churchill’s hunch was justified although Eden still had plenty of work to do. Ten days later the British COS informed Mountbatten that the CCS had agreed that the French Corps Leger would be moved to Ceylon as soon as possible for deployment in the Far East. Churchill had triumphed, but the real victory belonged to the Foreign Office.
Pgs. 97-99The Foreign Office observed with contempt the American duplicity in accepting aid from colonial areas whilst at the same time championing the cause of trusteeship based upon accusations of European underdevelopment: ‘the Americans have not disdained the use of our territories particularly India and Burma and the considerable resources which those territories have made available for them’. It was acerbically noted that:
The ‘fundamental principle on which the very existence of the United States rested’ was . . . in abeyance when the US wrested what is now Southern California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas from the Mexicans, and when the North forced the Confederate southern states to stay within the Union.
In the meantime the French Government issued the Brazzaville Declaration. This aimed to entwine the political aspirations of the French metropole and Indo-China as one component within a new French Union. The Declaration was progressive and signified a more benevolent post-war direction for Franco-Indo-Chinese relations. The French Union was to form the main mechanism for the post-war administration of the French Empire. True self-government would not be possible; nevertheless ‘liberty’ would be allowed but only within the boundaries of the Union. The French remained suspicious of the motives of others. De Gaulle attacked the American stance towards France and called for American supplies for French troops operating against the Japanese.
Pg. 99Britain organised a meeting of the Dominions Prime Ministers to co-ordinate a unified response to United Nations policies prior to the San Francisco Conference. Trusteeship was included in their discussions…..Australia and New Zealand were critical of Britain for adopting the Yalta changes on trusteeship without first consulting with them. But at San Francisco they supported the British line…..Roosevelt had been a strong advocate of trusteeship but, even before his death, other nations appeared to be steering his vision for decolonisation into a different sunset.
Pg. 100To be responsible for ‘bearing their cross for them’ regarding Indo-China. Dening was instructed from London that official British policy was ‘to help her [France] to recover her former strength and influence and to cultivate the closest possible relations with her. We regard a strong and friendly France as an essential factor for our post-war security’. The Foreign Office and the Prime Minister were operating in step with one another. It was imperative for Britain to continue to protect the welfare of all of the European colonial powers concerning trusteeship – voluntary or otherwise – lest a model for decolonisation be accepted that could annihilate the European colonial system. The maintenance of the extra-European colonial system was not the only issue at stake. The internal peace and security of post-war Western Europe relied upon political stability and economic rejuvenation in order to face the expected future threat from Russia. Leadership of a grouping of European colonial powers would preserve Britain’s position as a Great Power. The British Empire and Dominions acting alongside the other European Empires would act as a counter weight to the growing power of Russia. This would be threatened by trusteeship.
Pg. 100Sir Neville Butler, Superintending Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, lunched with John Hickerson, Sub-Head of the European Office of the State Department, at the San Francisco Conference. Hickerson revealed that the American stance at Yalta concerning voluntary trusteeship had been designed by the State Department to allow for a ‘climb down’ from the late President’s hard-line approach. Hickerson believed that voluntary trusteeship would not now be forced upon the French but that they could activate it if they so desired. He revealed that the State Department considered Roosevelt’s stand on trusteeship a step ‘too far’ and voluntary trusteeship a necessary ‘face saver’ for America. Eden told Truman at San Francisco that he was ‘satisfied’ that all trusteeship questions would soon be settled, although the British delegation did have a lot of problems with the Russian negotiators concerning trusteeship. Russia supported full independence for all colonial areas. On the other hand the French representatives objected to the use of the word ‘independence’ in the draft of the United Nations Charter. Georges Bidault, the French Foreign Minister, also announced that France was not prepared to place Indo-China under any form of trusteeship. France was flexing its muscles. It had been accorded a permanent seat on the United Nations council. Once again it was a Great Power.
Pgs. 103-104For the remainder of this post I have pulled quotes from Smith’s work that further shed light onto the sources of the American position to support France and Britain across Southeast Asia following FDR’s death. This book has provided greater insights to how the stage was set for America to enter the war in Vietnam:
The San Francisco Conference progressed in a direction amiable to Britain. Eden also liked Truman’s confidence and decisiveness. The President informed Eden: ‘I am here to make decisions, and whether they prove right or wrong I am going to take them’.139 The United Nations Charter established at San Francisco included apparatus for the management of trusteeships – chapter 12. Self-government and self-development were important principles included within the text. But the voluntary system for trusteeship developed at Yalta was enshrined as article 77. France would not lose Indo-China to an American trusteeship and a precedent for decolonisation was avoided. The CCS and the leadership of the Big Three assembled at Potsdam, just outside Berlin, for the European victors’ conference (18 July– 2 August). In the triumph of the moment and the sobriety of the location, doubt and suspicion were forgotten. Truman congratulated Mountbatten with his success at SEAC. The President said that both he and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff were ‘grateful’ with the ‘impartial way’ that Mountbatten had managed SEAC and conducted its affairs. Truman flattered Mountbatten that: ‘we in America regard you in exactly the same light as Eisenhower is regarded by the British; that is, we really do appreciate your integrity, and the admirable way which you have run your command’. Had Wedemeyer been party to the conversation he would have probably choked at his Commander in Chief’s sycophancy. But he would have expressed full agreement with Brooke’s assessment of Mountbatten at a COS meeting a couple of weeks later: ‘Seldom has a Supreme Commander been more deficient of the main attributes of a Supreme Commander than Dickie Mountbatten’.
Churchill would not be at the helm to steer Britain into the post-war world. The British general election result was declared during the Potsdam Conference. Churchill was deposed from office by the electorate. It was a grievous blow to a prime minister who had struggled to preserve so much in the face of such adversity. But Churchill’s health at Potsdam was once again failing, and yet again he was having trouble mastering his brief. The time had come for the old warhorse to take a rest. The Potsdam Conference confirmed changes to the Allied theatre boundaries between SEAC and China Theatre. But as a concessionary gesture to Chiang Kai-Shek, Truman and the new British Prime Minister Clement Attlee separated Indo-China between SEAC and the China Theatre along the 16 parallel. China would be responsible for northern Vietnam and northern Laos. SEAC was to assume responsibility for southern Vietnam, southern Laos and the whole of Cambodia for all further Allied Land Force operations. The Foreign Office feared a negative French reaction to such a measure. Cadogan, in particular, could not ‘pretend to be happy’ with the proposal. But the Foreign Office did not raise any formal objection as the CCS considered the divi-sion to be of military importance. In August following the dropping of the Atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, SEAC became responsible for the administration of the Japanese surrender within southern Indo-China.
Pgs. 104-105The age of American foreign policy being based upon the impulses of an indecisive juggler king was over. Truman was taking United States diplomacy in a different direction. Truman may have been inexperienced in foreign policy but he was at least decisive. He was also a team player who was eager to rely upon experts in the State Department, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to make up for his lack of knowledge. As Truman slowly asserted him-self in his new role, he also quietly removed from office the sycophants from Roosevelt’s circus and the more liberal elements of the Democratic Party – all of who saw themselves, rather than Truman, as the natural heirs and guardians of Roosevelt’s foreign policy. American foreign pol-icy therefore became more critical of Russia and in doing so it required the United States to covet the support of the old world imperial powers upon whom Roosevelt had desired to enact trusteeship: Belgian, Britain, France, the Netherlands and Portugal.
Pg.106The change of an American president permitted the Foreign Office, at the San Francisco and Potsdam conferences, the luxury of not only diffusing Roosevelt’s trusteeship policy but also combining American, British and European interests for the rebirth of European imperialism. Within a matter of months, Roosevelt’s grand strategy of international trusteeship for French Indo-China had unravelled. The speed of this American foreign policy volte-face was impressive. A grave threat to Anglo-American relations had been averted. Yet the resolution of the trusteeship debate and the preservation of Churchill’s special relation-ship with the United States had more to do with a shift in the balance of power within Washington than merely the death of the trusteeship architect – as important as this proved to be. Just as the origin of Britain’s conflict with the United States over Indo-Chinese trusteeship lay in Washington, so too did its resolution. Despite the political acumen of the British establishment – whether in the Dominions Office, COS, Foreign Office or the political elite – and the personal diplomacy of Churchill and his special relationship with the United States, resolution of the conflict came about through a number of changes outside of their control. The most important of these alterations were a transformation in Franco-American relations, a shift in power within the Washington establishment and the sudden change in president at a crucial wartime juncture. Roosevelt has often been portrayed as having a foreign policy that was unique. He certainly had many allies within the Washington establishment and elsewhere who were ready both to agree and to indulge in his anti-imperial and anti-French sentiments. Important advisers such as Hull, Hurley, Leahy, Stilwell, Wedemeyer and Donovan (the latter was the Head of the Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency) provided Roosevelt with an appreciative audience for his views and were all natural accomplices against the British and the French.
Pg 107Large elements of the State Department, the armed forces and even the inner sanctum of the administration within the White House, were not in agreement with the President or his incongruous group of flatterers. As early as February 1943, Roosevelt was already receiving strong opposition from the State Department towards his anti-French feelings. The State Department Sub-Committee on Security Problems was advocating that it was in America’s interest for France – and in so doing the French Empire – to be restored as a Great Power. France would there-fore be able to become a strong component in American policy against Russia. The perceived wisdom was that any future threat to American security would come from communist rather than imperialist ideology. Because of the President’s personal animosity towards the French, a year later, the State Department Country and Area Committee on the Far East went as far as to declare Indo-China a unique colonial question rather than part of mainstream policy. Roosevelt would have no doubt been pleased with such apparent anti-colonial feeling. Nonetheless, Indo-China’s exclusive status outside of conventional colonial think-ing indicated that all was not well within the State Department. Indeed, Indo-China’s special designation hardly set a precedent for decolonisation. Similarly, the actual composition of the Committee reflected Washington divisions towards such issues. When the Committee voted on two possible solutions for post-war Indo-China, there was an even split between those that supported Roosevelt’s trusteeship scheme and those that subscribed to the possibility of permitting a limited French return.
In spite of strong protestations from the State Department about future threats to American security, Roosevelt was able initially to keep the State Department isolated from his high policy pontificating about trusteeship for French Indo-China. American foreign policy was his personal domain, but even he was ultra-cautious about its operation.
Pg. 108Yet by 1944 – when paradoxically Roosevelt appeared to Halifax to be at his most zealous in his quest to dispose of Indo-China – the State Department had begun to challenge Roosevelt’s dominance of foreign policy. Initially, the State Department merely questioned China’s commitment to the principles of the Atlantic Charter. But as the problems surrounding Roosevelt’s fourth global policeman (China) grew, China’s importance to American foreign policy diminished. In the process Roosevelt’s policy of trusteeship for Indo-China was undermined.
In these circumstances officials at the White House and within the State Department sought to develop – separately for the moment – a more coherent American policy towards Southeast Asia and specifically Indo-China. Therefore, just as Roosevelt appeared to be at his most vociferous concerning Indo-Chinese issues, the Washington bureaucracy was lay-ing the very foundations that would eventually restrict his free-wheeling policies.
In the meantime, the second Quebec Conference (August–September 1943) appeared to offer Roosevelt good cheer. Churchill had sufficiently stroked his ego and Roosevelt had led Churchill to believe that their special relationship had risen above the animosities and petty jealousies of both nations. In the process, a clearly flattered Churchill signed up to American war aims – one of which was an end to old world imperial-ism as exemplified by the French in Indo-China – as the United States assumed the role of the senior partner in the relationship. This had left Churchill at the mercy of an American president whose wartime objectives included a very different vision of what the post-war world would look like. At this juncture, Brooke and Eden correctly discerned the threat posed by Roosevelt. Yet they both failed to readdress the balance as Churchill was committed to a romantic vision of Anglo-American unity. This notion made Roosevelt’s war aims easier to achieve. But paradoxically, the Quebec Conference also undermined Roosevelt’s most fanatical anti-imperial policy. The conference had further diminished the importance of China and Southeast Asia to American military and foreign policy objectives. The conference had decided to centre United States policy in the war in the Far East towards a stratagem of island hop-ping across the Pacific Ocean. This had moved the focus of American wartime planning away from the Chinese and Southeast Asian theatres, and Britain naturally sought to step into the strategic vacuum. Meanwhile, Roosevelt persisted in advocating a policy of trusteeship for French Indo-China. But events also continued to threaten his clarity on this issue. By October 1944 the majority of France had been liberated and de Gaulle’s Provisional Government had established itself in Paris. Roosevelt’s diplomatic recognition of the French Provisional Government signalled an important blow against Nazism in Europe. The United States, the champion of oppressed peoples, had resurrected France from tyranny. No doubt Roosevelt viewed trusteeship for the Indo-Chinese as a similar form of emancipation. Nevertheless, the diplomatic recognition of the Provisional Government further blunted Roosevelt’s vision for Indo-China. An independent French Government – established by the Allies – under the stewardship of de Gaulle was never going to permit an American president to dictate the rebirth of a once proud imperial nation, let alone allow Roosevelt to administer the decolonisation of one of its most important colonies. In order to remove the stains of the defeat of 1940 and the subsequent Vichy collaboration, French belligerence could be expected in all areas of national pride. Similarly, Britain and France would be thrown together as uneasy allies against Roosevelt-led anti-imperialism. The President’s Indo-China policy had definitely become more complicated, however the juggler was not defeated and Indo-Chinese trusteeship remained an attainable goal. After all, the United States was a creditor nation. France was in debt and would need American finance to re-establish itself. Roosevelt could afford to be patient and bide his time. He held the purse strings of the French recovery. France – now reconstituted as a European power – sought to assert its interests further and the State Department found itself temporarily aligned with French concerns. Both were keen to see Roosevelt’s foreign policy fiefdom further restricted. In the light of rapidly changing international circumstances, on 1 November 1944 the State Department took the initiative and lobbied the President for clarification about current American policy towards French Indo-China. In his response, Roosevelt revealed that as far as he was concerned nothing had changed. No American aid was to be given to the French with respect to Indo-China and all American officials were expected to refrain from political discussions about the future of French Indo-China. He alone would decide upon the timing and implementation of American Indo-Chinese policies. In addition, Roosevelt anticipated that he would naturally be consulted by the British and the other colonial powers about their future plans for Southeast Asia. Trusteeship was still very much at the fore-front of the President’s mind. He was confident enough of his vision and purpose to impose draconian terms on both the Allies and his administration in order to implement it. On 30 November Hull retired as Secretary of State because of ill health and was replaced by Edward Stettinius. With Stettinius’ appointment by Roosevelt, a delicate change in the direction of American foreign pol-icy had taken place. Stettinius’ promotion from Under-Secretary was evidence that Roosevelt would continue to regard foreign policy as his personal fiefdom. Yet with Stettinius’ advancement the European Office within the State Department had been brought to the forefront of American decision making.
Pgs. 109-111At the turn of the year Stettinius met with the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy and Roosevelt’s special adviser – Harry Hopkins. The purpose of the meeting was to re-evaluate Roosevelt’s approach towards French Indo-China. All agreed that the President’s indecision was a grave policy error which was damaging the newly re-established Franco-American relationship. Failure to address the Indo-Chinese question could pose significant problems for American European policy
Pg. 111Nevertheless, despite the rejuvenation of France a significant stain remained upon the French wartime record that enabled Roosevelt to continue to press for Indo-Chinese trusteeship. France may have been liberated in Europe but in French Indo-China a Vichy-led French regime still existed. As long as this persisted and Frenchmen seemed to be collaborating with the Japanese in their efforts against the Allies, Roosevelt could continue to indulge in his pursuit of trusteeship with moral vigour. Yet in the rapidly changing global circumstances, the ambiguity of the previous Vichy regime continuing to be the sole bastion of French treachery proved short lived. The Japanese coup of 9 March in Indo-China against the Vichy authorities clarified French international standing. The last remaining and highly symbolic vestige of collaboration with Germany and Japan had been removed. Indo-China had become an enemy-occupied territory in Southeast Asia. French troops were at last openly fighting the Japanese. The French Government thus sought to liberate its Southeast Asian occupied territory and free its population from tyranny in the same vein as the British (who were attempting to orchestrate efforts towards Burma, Hong Kong, Malaya and Singapore) and the Dutch (in the Netherlands East Indies). De Gaulle naturally used the opportunity that the Japanese coup presented to him to great effect. He openly challenged American, and therefore Roosevelt’s, anti-French sentiments. With French troops actively engaged against Japanese forces de Gaulle was emboldened to directly threaten the United States. He claimed that any further anti-French or anti-French Indo-Chinese policies would push his fledgling nation into the Soviet orbit for diplomatic assistance and protection.
Yet despite the rapidly changing situation both within Europe and Southeast Asia, no clear direction appeared forthcoming concerning American policy. The State, War and Navy Committee still had no indication of the President’s intentions and therefore sought once again to clarify American policy towards Indo-China. The State Department naturally wanted to orchestrate American foreign policy and to con-struct a consistent and integrated approach towards both Europe and Southeast Asia. But progress regarding American Indo-Chinese policy remained blocked by Roosevelt. The control of American foreign policy was therefore being contested by two rival architects with wildly differ-ing visions towards the outlook for the post-war world. The momentum, however, now appeared to swing towards the State Department and away from Roosevelt. The President knew what he wanted to achieve but his poor administrative skills meant that he did not know how he was going to get there. Here the State Department held the advantage. Its liaison with Hopkins, the War and Navy Departments, its count-less policy memoranda and discussions, and its growing relationship with the French Provisional Government enabled the State Department to concoct a dual policy towards French Indo-China in opposition to Roosevelt.
Pg. 113Throughout the spring of 1945, officials from both sides of the Atlantic continued to harass the President’s position. Anglo-American naval discussion in Washington, between the British Admiral James Sommerville and the Commander in Chief of the American Navy Admiral Ernest King, had revealed to the British Government that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff was not in favour of Roosevelt’s decision to exclude the French from IndoChina. The American military establishment was opposed to the President’s Indo-Chinese trusteeship policy and it was prepared to fight Roosevelt in the political arena. The Secretary of State for War, Stimson, felt empowered to challenge Roosevelt’s control of the Indo-Chinese debate and even the Office of Strategic Services, which contained numerous anti-colonial stalwarts, was not now prepared to support the President on this particular issue. An Office of Strategic Services report that had been commissioned to re-evaluate American policy cautioned against the future use of trusteeship. It concluded that the ‘unrest’ and ‘colonial disintegration’ resulting from this policy would isolate the United States from its European allies, whose help was necessary to balance the United States against the growing power of the Soviet Union. Roosevelt’s vision of the post-war world was based upon harmony and not equilibrium. But the Office of Strategic Services now favoured a more British approach to the post-war world, based upon the balance of power, and in doing so undermined Roosevelt still further.
Roosevelt’s death represented a tragic blow to American foreign policy. Its chief architect had been removed from the stage at a crucial moment in geopolitics. Within a month the war in the West would be over, and the San Francisco and Potsdam Conferences would be convened to usher in the post-war world order – a world order that Roosevelt had intended to dictate.
Pgs. 113-114Therefore the President’s death, before the San Francisco and Potsdam Conferences, appeared to stall American foreign policy at a crucial juncture – the dawning of the post-war world. But Roosevelt’s death was also timely. Because Roosevelt’s foreign policy was unique to himself, his death removed the sole obstacle to the State Department’s dominance of American policy towards French Indo-China. In one fateful act, two contesting policies had become one. The State Department could now move into the foreign policy vacuum vacated by Roosevelt. The day after Roosevelt’s death, an initial special briefing dossier was presented to the new President by Stettinius. This was designed to bring Truman up to speed with American foreign policy and the broader context of international relations. The report highlighted British security fears and Britain’s declining role within geopolitics ‘to that of a junior partner of the Big Three’. It advised that ‘The best interests of the United States require that every effort be made by this government to assist France, morally as well as physically, to regain her strength and influence’. The paper cautioned that ‘in connection with Indo-China [France] showed unreasonable suspicions of American aims’. The State Department had thereby advocated a pro-French policy to the new President and neglected to mention Roosevelt’s trusteeship plans.
The rest of the Washington establishment was also moving quickly. On the same day the American Army spokesperson on the State, War and Navy Committee boldly voiced his misgivings about Roosevelt’s policies. The development of two opposing policies towards French Indo-China was not in the military’s interest. The representative criticised the policy vacuum. It was a ‘serious embarrassment’ for the military which was fighting alongside French and other European forces against Germany and Japan. The Committee agreed with his stance. Roosevelt’s prohibition of the Indo-China debate would have to be immediately re-evaluated or restated. This outburst was merely a fore-taste of a more radical foreign policy volte-face as the State Department moved into the ascendancy, and in doing so aligned American and British policy concerning the future of French Indo-China. Three days later a more detailed State Department policy manual was prepared for Truman. The dossier built upon the themes already set out in Stettinius’ initial briefing paper. Although Britain and the United States were committed towards the ‘progressive development of dependent peoples towards self-government’ the paper described this in vague and uncertain future terms. It was made clear to Truman in a confident tone that ‘The United States does not favour the impairment of British sovereignty over British colonial (i.e. not mandated) territory through the exercise of other than advisory functions by any international body’. Thus there would be no trusteeship for Hong Kong. American policy towards French colonial possessions was even clearer: ‘Our policy has been to act in those areas in co-operation and agreement with the local French authorities and to respect French sovereignty’. The pro-French State Department policy promoted to Truman several days earlier had been reiterated. Again, the State Department failed to reveal Roosevelt’s trusteeship policy or Roosevelt’s embargo upon sustaining the French in Indo-China. Indeed, in the specific section dealing with Indo-China the manual stated that ‘No final decisions have been made by this Government as to the future of Indo-China’. The language in the report gave the appearance of continuity and an already long-established government policy. But in reality Roosevelt’s guiding principles were not being recapitulated or communicated to Truman. It was later confirmed that the State Department had deliberately misled the new President. Roosevelt had intended that the San Francisco Conference would not only herald the emergence of his world organisation but also the principles for future trusteeships. In the event, however, the San Francisco Conference (April–June 1945) presented the State Department with the opportunity to resolve the Indo-Chinese dispute with France. At the conference the French Foreign Minister irately challenged Stettinius about trusteeship. Bidault made it very clear to the American Secretary of State that France did not propose to place Indo-China under any form of trusteeship, voluntary or otherwise. The hostile French response no doubt provoked a feeling of satisfaction from the State Department delegation. The original State Department policy of voluntary trusteeship had been designed with such a reaction in mind. Voluntary trusteeship was a sham, designed to allow for a withdrawal from Roosevelt’s entrenched position. In such circumstances, the Secretary of State’s amnesia permitted both a full American climb down and for assurances to be made to France. Stettinius informed Bidault and Henri Bonnet, the French Ambassador to the United States, that ‘the record is entirely innocent of any official statement of this Government questioning, even by implication, French sovereignty over Indo-China’. Roosevelt’s policy of trusteeship had been erased from the record. The United States needed amiable relationships with Britain and France for any possible future confrontation against the Soviet Union. France’s rehabilitation as a Great Power was complete. Roosevelt would have enacted far heavier terms upon the French. In his hands the substantial American veto in the post-war inter-national organisation would have been far more ruthlessly deployed.
Roosevelt had never been shy about using his veto. But Stettinius now held an olive branch aloft to the French delegation. The fifth permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council was being awarded to France: ‘the United States welcomes this important step in the return of France to her rightful place in world affairs’.
The origins of the Vietnam War have long fascinated historians, and the Vietnamese policies that Truman inherited from Roosevelt have become an area of intense academic debate. Roosevelt may have known very little about Indo-China, but he was determined to liberate it from France. Indeed, he had expressed on a number of occasions that it was one of his principle war aims to remove Indo-China from the French Empire and to place it in some form of trusteeship in preparation for independence. Roosevelt’s death, before his plans had been realised, has caused historians to consider whether a power vacuum was created at a crucial moment in American foreign policy which fashioned a lost opportunity for the United States. The consequences of this lost opportunity would, in turn, lead to much suffering for France and the United States, and haunt the Vietnamese for generations.
Pg. 117On the one hand Roosevelt treated trusteeship as a religious conviction. He was deeply ideologically committed to the notion of granting independence to colonial peoples. Despite the westward expansion of the United States and the later acquisition of the Philippines, Puerto Rico and Hawaii, Roosevelt shared popular American suspicions about old world imperialism. As a former British colony, the United States was engrained with deep anti-colonial feelings and Roosevelt could use trusteeship to prove to the American electorate that the United States was not fighting the Second World War merely to restore.
Pg. 117Roosevelt was content to allow the ideological and the practical aspects of trusteeship to operate independently of one another. This increased policy fluidity. But the President was at his most dangerous when he shrewdly chose to merge the ideological and the practical together. It was in these moments that the British Foreign Office most despaired. By maintaining these two approaches towards trusteeship and not committing himself to one hard and fast policy, Roosevelt created the circumstances where – after his death – Truman struggled to grasp the initiative in American foreign policy. Roosevelt’s ‘foreign policy had been so personal to himself that it was doubtful whether Truman or anyone he asked really appreciated what its “general line” had been’.
This power vacuum enabled Americans in China Theatre and the Office of Strategic Services to continue to apply Roosevelt’s policies. Even after Stettinius, on behalf of Truman, had personally reassured Bidault at the San Francisco Conference about American support for the return of France to Indo-China, the strongly anti-colonial Hurley was still badgering Truman that such a move was contrary to Roosevelt’s policy.
Truman had certainly not helped himself regarding Hurley. Whilst Truman was still coming to terms with American foreign policy he had previously written to Hurley asking the Ambassador to ‘continue your efforts to accomplish the purposes outlined to you by President Roosevelt’. Hurley knew some of Roosevelt’s thoughts about Indo-Chinese trusteeship issues. However, because of the nature of Truman’s initial briefing by the State Department he assumed that his Indo-Chinese policy was a natural continuation of Roosevelt’s. Hurley was not convinced that this was the case and sought to caution Truman that Britain was trying to use the debate ‘to re-establish the prestige of imperialism’. A further warning highlighted that Roosevelt had intended to remove Hong Kong from British control to which Churchill had replied ‘over my dead body’.
Pg. 117-118Roosevelt’s trusteeship policy had never anticipated the growth of Asian nationalism. Yet the potential American sponsorship of Asian independence from Japanese or Western imperialism was not without its appeal. The trusteeship argument was not lost on the leadership of the Vietnamese nationalist coalition, the Vietminh, or its main protagonist Ho Chi Minh. In July 1945, as Truman struggled with Roosevelt’s legacy, the Vietminh requested France to provide for a Vietnamese post-war parliament under French tutelage and for full independence to be granted ‘in a minimum of five years and a maximum of ten’.51 Later, the Vietnamese declaration of independence in September 1945 dropped the call for trusteeship but still used symbolic imagery of freedom, as expressed in the American declaration of independence, to proclaim their freedom: ‘All men are created equal. They are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights; among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of happiness’.
Roosevelt’s political cunning was embodied in trusteeship. Ideologically it resounded with the beliefs of the American people. Practically it remained fluid, in constant revision and adaptable to meet any challenge. By not formally integrating trusteeship into any formal American foreign policy, Roosevelt kept it pure, untainted by the State Department and available to be played with whenever he saw fit. But Roosevelt was not lacking in insight or intellectual prowess. Just as he was conscious of the wartime opportunities, so too did he understand the constraints. Roosevelt was well aware of the opposition within both Washington and London to his trusteeship policy.53 He found it difficult to express any confidence in the British Foreign Office.54 His frequent outbursts at the American Joint Chiefs of Staff were not merely anti-French or anti-British eruptions but also an attack on his own advisers who believed that trusteeship jeopardised American military and political policy concerning mandate territories and the future of the Japanese islands.
Pg. 119Roosevelt was focussed upon his destination – the post-war peace conference. He had the foresight to understand that the United States would be the only major creditor that he held all of the main cards. This would be ‘an American peace that belonged to him to dictate its organisation’. Roosevelt therefore could be patient. He would choose when to confer about post-war planning and reconstruction. Roosevelt could clinically apply the threat of trusteeship when it was only absolutely necessary or, even more deviously, when he personally desired to toy with it. Thus Roosevelt’s silences and inactivity, which have sometimes been construed as abandonment, were merely part of his political armoury. The only weakness in his armour – and one which he did not consider – was the possibility of his own death before peace could be realised.
Pg.120British fears and criticisms were not eased by the breadth of weapons in the President’s diplomatic arsenal which were arrayed against them. In Washington, Halifax witnessed first-hand Roosevelt’s playful and disorganised manner. The President often chose to use conversation as others used ‘a first draft on paper’.
Halifax had plenty of opportunities to observe Roosevelt’s devious methods of getting things done. The President’s fluid revisionism, his failure to integrate trusteeship within the broader context of American geopolitics and his reluctance to adopt a clearly defined stance upon trusteeship all resulted in particular disquiet in London. The conclusion in the Foreign Office was that ‘The Americans do not wish us to recover our previous position in Asia, confuse this wish in their minds with the principle of self-determination (alias “freedom”) and so see in every move to recover lost property a similar desire to enslave native peoples’.
Trusteeship was therefore an attack, based on the Atlantic Charter, upon the old European imperial system; and the Charter itself appeared to be stimulated by the potential for American economic gain.
Roosevelt had to be careful in his commitment to national self-determination. On the one hand, trusteeship was his technique of nobly advancing indigenous peoples towards independence. It was thereby a means of convincing the American people that Roosevelt was not fight-ing the war merely to restore the bankrupt European colonial system. But on the other hand, Roosevelt had to avoid splitting the Allied cause by drawing the European powers together against the United States on this issue.
Pg. 120Roosevelt found de Gaulle arrogant and aloof. The French leader’s ‘autocratic temperament and his constant practice of playing off Britain against America’ did not ingratiate him with the President. Roosevelt saw de Gaulle as representing ‘acute and unconquerable nationalism’ when France no longer possessed the status of a Great Power. Churchill enjoyed a bittersweet relationship with de Gaulle, but the Foreign Office was openly considerate of the Free French cause…..The Foreign Office was apprehensive that the French nation state’s interests were being deliberately excluded from Allied decision-making by Roosevelt. A manoeuvre designed to punish France, for its capitulation to Germany and Japan, and to assist trusteeship. The Free French were equally (if not more) suspicious of American policy during the Second World War. Humiliated by the Germans and the Japanese, Free French pride was easily bruised by American impediment and added to their paranoia…..The Foreign Office correctly assumed that Roosevelt’s plan of trusteeship for French Indo-China would create a blueprint for further decolonisation. Indeed, Britain feared permitting a precedent that could be eventually applied to Hong Kong being removed from the British Empire or Timor from Portugal. Nevertheless, the President did little to calm British suspicions as he appeared willing to ignore pre-vious American guarantees, including his own, in order to satisfy his trusteeship objective.
Pg. 121Roosevelt’s vision for trusteeship had never imagined the growth of Asian nationalism.67 Nonetheless, the war had invigorated it and although it can be argued that things would have been very different if Roosevelt had lived, given his fluid and personal approach to foreign policy and Indo-China in particular, the President’s response to such a challenge is impossible to guess. Strangely enough, Roosevelt was not against the notion of deploying either American or Chinese troops in Indo-China, and he had even requested for invasion plans to be drawn up to this effect. How such forces would have fared is again impossible to deduce. The subsequent history of the Vietnam War would have been very different if this had been the case. But Roosevelt did not live to see his dreams realised and Britain appeared to attain a satisfactory closure to the wartime Indo-China debate.
Pg. 124the Japanese had merely replaced the French as the resident imperial power. Yet under Japanese guidance Cambodian and Vietnamese nationalism began to evolve. A number of Indo-Chinese exiles, who had been residing in Tokyo, were permitted to return to Indo-China. The Japanese established these ‘independent’ nationalists in prominent positions within their collaborator regimes. At the same time a Vietnamese nationalist coalition, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, established a working relationship with the American Office of Strategic Services in China Theatre. The Vietminh, predominantly based in northern Vietnam, provided American officers with intelligence reports of Japanese activities and also rescued American pilots shot down over Indo-China, in return for a small amount of equipment and political support. The relationship proved to be of mutual benefit. Thus in July the Office of Strategic Services despatched a liaison team to the Vietminh headquarters located behind the Japanese lines.
Pg. 126In Vietnam, the Vietminh gradually began to assume control of the country. On the same day that the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima the Vietminh publicly declared its intention to disarm the Japanese before the arrival of any Allied Liberation Force and receive the Allied forces as the legitimate government of Vietnam. At this stage the Vietminh was a loose coalition of Vietnamese nationalist parties, including the Indo-Chinese Communist Party led by Ho Chi Minh. Within a few years the communists would purge their competitors and assume direct control of the Vietminh movement.
Pg. 127The National Committee of the Indo-Chinese Communist Party met on 13 August 1945 to con-sider its next move. Following its deliberations, a general insurrection was proclaimed by the Vietminh to seize the northern provincial capital of Hanoi and a massed rally was held in Hanoi on 17 August. The next day the Vietminh seized a large quantity of weapons and rapidly spread out from Hanoi to assume control of as much of Vietnam as possible. On 2 September, by coincidence the same day that the Allies received the formal Japanese surrender, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed the Vietnamese declaration of independence in Hanoi. The stage was set for the tragic struggle of Vietnamese nationalism vis-à-vis Western imperialism. Mountbatten was probably relieved with MacArthur’s delay to Allied landings. He was not ready to assume peacekeeping duties in Cambodia and southern Vietnam. British planners were not prepared for South-east Asian liberation duties. Unlike the Americans they had very little knowledge as to the actual situation on the ground. In the same way, they were unaware of the logistical problems posed by American bomb-ing of Japanese port and railway facilities during the final months of the war. In essence the British planners believed that because of the large French population they needed to prepare for some sort of European-style liberation where Allied troops would be welcomed as heroes. In consequence, they neglected the combined possibility of indigenous nationalist resistance to the return of colonial rule and a shortage of basic resources. Therefore, when the first British troops landed in southern Indo-China on 6 September, they found themselves ill-prepared to be peace enforcers rather than peacekeepers. Caught between the French antics for the reestablishment of imperialism, the frustrations of war-weary French colonists and the birth pangs of Cambodian and Vietnamese nationalism, a pitifully small number of British troops attempted to maintain some semblance of law and order, disarm the 75,000 plus Japanese forces and keep essential utilities working. (War Office planners had believed that it would be possible to manage the Japanese surrender within French Indo-China with a SEAC force of 25,748 of which 803 were to be French colonial troops.
Pg. 128Faced with an increasingly dire humanitarian condition and the potential for extreme violence, the commander of the British forces, Major-General Sir Douglas Gracey, imposed a strict curfew and Mountbatten controversially rearmed 10,500 Japanese troops – who were by now officially Allied prisoners of war – to serve as additional peacekeepers.
Mountbatten repeatedly lobbied Attlee for additional troops. The requests were made in vain. The Prime Minister considered the demobilisation of British imperial forces a greater political priority than the firestorms in Saigon or Phnom Penh.
Pg. 128Nonetheless Britain could neither escape its surrender responsibilities nor withdraw from Indo-China until adequate French forces had arrived. Trapped between the rebirth of French imperialism and the dawn of Cambodian and Vietnamese nationalism the British-led Allied Liberation Forces were caught in a conflict in which they behaved more like conquerors than liberators – burning houses and carrying out other counterinsurgency duties.21 The Second World War may have been officially over but Allied casualties continued to accumulate. Between 10 October 1945 and 21 January 1946 the British Indian Army suffered 988 casualties in policing French Indo-China. Japanese casualties were higher at 1303 whilst the French numbered 2700…..Even when sufficient French troops had arrived in Indo-China and Britain’s duties regarding the Japanese were deemed to have been sufficiently completed, Britain still found itself entangled by Indo-China. The main British Allied Liberation Force managed to withdraw in January 1946, but small numbers of British observers continued to operate in Vietnam and Cambodia as part of post-Second World War liberation obligations. It was not until the successful conclusion of the Siamese-Cambodian border dispute in late November 1946 that Britain became the first Western power to extricate itself from what would eventually be known as the Vietnam War.
Pgs. 128-129
This is a tremendous amount of research which opens old wounds. Smith will surprise many who believed we entered a war against the communist North Vietnamese defending democracy. Rather he proves to reveal a long dance of old empires and new ones slugging it out on the world stage to control power across the globe following World War II.