Did the seige at Dien Bien Phu became the single event that catapulted America fully into the Vietnam conflict? Howard Simpson’s Dien Bien Phu The Epic Battle America Forgot may actually be the best book for Americans to understand the significance of the French disaster.
Several books on this battle that I have read over the past two years are well researched, second-hand accounts. Simpson was the single American intelligence member actually within the fortress at the beginning of the siege. Many French officers who were to fight and die over the 59-day siege engaged Simpson during the buildup around the garrison.
By December 1953 French expeditionary forces would number 20,000 men. They would be surrounded by 64,500 enemy.
Simpson captured the futility of the French effort within the opening two chapters. The struggle by the Vietminh to face their colonial rulers must be viewed by Americans in the context of the 1775 American revolutionary war. The determination of the Vietminh proved decisive in this battle.
Sacrifices noted by Simpson show a Vietminh army fully engaged in revolutionary struggle to develop their tactics. His experience emphasizes the intelligence links with communist China who sent many lower ranking officers to aid the Vietminh in this battle. And to the frustration of French air efforts, this included Chinese units manning anti-aircraft guns. It cost the French dearly.
Chapter two ‘The Vise Tightens’ reveals hardships endured by French troops proving the strategy established by Commander Christian de Castries was simply out of touch with the battle ground reality set inside a valley. As an example the Vietminh established ambush points in the surrounding hills that would hamper future rescue efforts.
Most importantly in the buildup to the battle Simpson acknowledges the French failure to adjust tactics from their recent victory at Na San based upon a hedgehog defensive system. Their established mooring point that mimicked Na San would ultimately be a weakness as they confronted 20,000 Vietminh. To assume their enemy would not alter tactics after Na San reinforced their imperial attitude of the French throughout Indochina. Simpson’s experiences at Dien Bien Phu emphasize how out of touch the French prepared their defensive hedgehog system:
Since mid-December Vietminh forward observer and scouts, hidden in the tall elephant greats and bamboo of the hills, had kept the valley under surveillance….They also notes the continual clearing work going on in the valley as the garrison cut trees and brush in and soured the fortified positions. For the French, it was standard military procedure to open field of fire and deny close cover to the enemy. For the Vietminh, it meant that the French were stripping themselves naked, forgoing all concealment and revealing clumps of tall radio antennae that marked the exact locations of their principal CPs….In the valley below, colonel de Castries was taking a personnel interest in the cleanup work….The comments of an officer of the newly arrived fifth battalion of the Seventh Algerian Rifle Regiment reveals that not everyone agreed with the clearance orders. “De Castries insisted during his visit that all scrub foliage be cleared immediately.” Theo officer’s complained. “Our commanding officer argued that the Vietminh, less than 2 kilometers distant—-would be abode to observe the installation of the entire strongpoint and identify the emplacement of the command posts of the battalion, the companies, and our weapons positions. De Castries insisted.” The officer added his own opinion on the incident. “The concept of a cavalryman to defend an entrenched camp was not judicious. The days of the mounted charges had passed.”
pgs. 35-36
Simpson’s details of the extraordinary efforts by coolies and porters reveal their deeply coordinated efforts to move American equipment, captured by the Chinese in Korea. The idea of men pushing Dodge and Jeep trucks on bombed-out train tracks testified to the unbending determination of the Vietminh.
More striking was Simpson’s insight to American 105-millimeter howitzers also captured by the Chinese in their confrontation with Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Army. These would rain down upon the French garrison, all delivered on the backs of the Vietminh.
By March 13th it was very clear French airpower was vastly underpowered for the terrain surrounding Dien Bien Phu. Simpson initially acknowledged the US Air Force role including CIA contractors (Civil Air Transport Company) providing support for French efforts. The French were clearly being slaughtered at all outposts. Yet in a secret cable to Washington from the French HQ in Hanoi, French General Sturm reported:
Navarre said that Vietminh appeared [to] believe that presence at Dien Bien Phu of certain number of French union wounded for whom adequate medical facilities were not available might cause him, Navarre to break off engagement for humanitarian reasons. General said, however “even if I have 3000 wounded at Dien Bien Phu, that fact would not cause me to yield.
pg. 97
This was the perfect imperial attitude of war by a fading colonial empire. Simpson etches these examples throughout the book.
In chapter three, ‘Movement In The Mountains’ Simpson shares his experience in understanding the tremendous sacrifices by the Vietminh in literally moving mountains to choke their enemy. The Vietminh’s international communist effort, reinforced by China and the Soviet Union’s delivery of anti aircraft guns were key resources in their victory. French pilots complained bitterly in confronting 37 millimeter fire. The Soviets also provided ample supplies in order to field twelve Katyusha tubed rocket launchers.
In the closing pages of chapter seven “The Meat Grinder” Simpson reveals the deeper role of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff including Vice President Richard Nixon in a secret communication from France to President Eisenhower on March 31:
The urgency of providing more security to the supply effort had brought French air Force officers together with their American counterparts to use C– 119 “Flying boxcars” for massive napalm bombing of the Vietminh gun positions. This effort entailed considerable American involvement, including procuring additional napalm supplies from U.S. stocks in the Far East, working out the details of such operations, training aircrews in an entirely new technique, and dry-run test flights. The project first had to be approved at the higher level by both the French and the Americans. This approval raised a delicate question in Washington since the majority of the 29 C–119s flying missions over Dien Bien Phu now had an American crews.
pg.86
When France finally acknowledged defeat was at hand they turned to America to save the garrison:
On April 5, the American ambassador in Paris, Douglas Dillon, sent a secret cable to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles describing an emergency meeting with George Dalton, France’s Foreign Minister, and Joseph Laniel, the French prime minister. Dillon has been summoned to the prime minister’s residence late on Sunday night to be told that “Armed intervention of the US aircraft carrier at Dien Bien Phu is now necessary to save the situation.” Navarre’s report on the scope of Chinese involvement at Dien Bien Phu was provided to Dillon who was included in his message. Dillon also passed on Biedeau’s warning that the French air chief of staff stated that U.S. intervention at Dien Bien Phu could lead to Chinese air attacks on French airfields in the Tonkin Delta. Regardless the French government was making its request for aid. Dillon quoted the French foreign minister’s conclusion that “For good or evil, the fate of southeast Asia now rested on Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva conference could be won or lost depending on the outcome at Dien Bien Phu.
pgs. 117-118
History reveals it was not meant to be. Simpson shows this would be a mistake by Eisenhower and LBJ that proved tragic beyond words for America in the coming decade.