Air War in the North: 1965 – 1968 Its interesting to read Pentagon Papers Volume IV-C7 to learn how global politics was playing out against China for a majority of the war. To be frank it’s all stated at the beginning of the volume on the US air war in the north:
1 Jul 65
Under Secretary of State George Ball memo to the President.
Ball argues for “cutting our losses” in Vietnam and negotiating an end to the war. A massive US intervention would likely require complete achievement of our objectives or humiliation, both at terrible costs.
Ball was the Director of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey in London during the war which measured the impact of bombing Nazi Germany. Before Johnson, Ball served President Kennedy and was the only one in the President’s inner circle who opposed escalating the war in Vietnam.
He told President Kennedy “within five years we’ll have 300,000 men in the paddies and jungles and never find them again.” In response to this prediction, “JFK is reported to have laughed and replied, “Well, George, you’re supposed to be one of the smartest guys in town, but you’re crazier than hell. That will never happen.” Further in this Volume George Ball wrote a telling statement before Kennedy’s assassination:
Politically, South Viet-Nam is a lost cause. The country is bled white from twenty years of war and the people are sick of it. The Viet Cong — as is shown by the Rand Corporation Motivation and Morale Study — are deeply committed. Hanoi has a Government and a purpose and a discipline. The “government” in Saigon is a travesty. In a very real sense, South Viet-Nam is a country with an army and no government. In my view, a deep commitment of United States forces in a land ‘war in South Viet-Nam would be a catastrophic error. If ever there was an occasion for a tactical withdrawal, this is it.
If only President Kennedy had listened to his advice. Maybe he did but did not live long enough to see it through.
Volume Part IV-C7a also introduced a number of related ground issues to support the air war against the North. Bombing played out on the global stage as memorandums and reports prepared for President Johnson focused on growing tension with both China and the Soviet Union as a result of American fire power in Rolling Thunder.
Deployments of the kind we have recommended will not guarantee success. Our intelligence estimate is that the present Communist policy is to continue to prosecute the war vigorously in the South. They continue to believe that the war will be a long one, that time is their ally, and that their own staying power is superior to ours. They recognize that the US reinforcements of 1965 signify a determination to avoid defeat, and that more US troops can be expected. Even though the Communists “will continue to suffer heavily from GVN and US ground and air action, we expect them, upon learning of any US intentions to augment its forces, to boost their own commitment and to test US capabilities and will to persevere at higher level of conflict and casualties (US killed-in-action with the recommended deployments can be expected to reach 1000 a month).
Should we be somewhat awestruck by the acknowledgment of the last sentence: US killed-in-action with the recommended deployments can be expected to reach 1000 a month?
Volume Part IV-C7a introduced a number of related ground issues to support the air war against the North. Bombing played out on the global stage as memorandums and reports prepared for President Johnson focused on growing tension with both China and the Soviet Union.