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Education Reading Vietnam War

Latest read: The Irony of Vietnam

The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked by Leslie Gelb is a review that American bureaucratic institutions prevailed across the Vietnam War.

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara appointed Leslie Gelb, following the death of John McNaughton to discover the history of American involvement in Vietnam. This top secret project Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force began in 1967 and became known as The Pentagon Papers after Dan Ellsberg leaked the study to the New York Times. 

The Irony of Vietnam: The System WorkedUnderstanding Gelb’s views and insights of the war you must acknowledge Gelb worked on CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64 known as Operation Rolling Thunder.

Readers should be well versed in the pre-World War II history of Indochina including American efforts via financially support in the French desire post-1946 to re-enslave the peoples of Indochina.

Gelb’s efforts well document the lost years of the American war 1966 to 1968. Interesting how Gelb viewed LBJ not finding consensus among his advisors on how to proceed …. victory was clearly understood as not achievable by 1965. Yet General Westmoreland could not convince LBJ that 480,000 more men would swing the tide of the war.

Gelb’s opinion of Operation Marigold brought refreshed insights that I did not easily recall from the Papers. The backdrop of a secret tunnel to establish peace via the Polish embassy detailed how intense the effort was in the White House set against the Air Force commitment to Gelb’s own Operation Rolling Thunder clipped any real chance at peace by December 1966. The war would continue for almost ten more years.

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Education Reading Vietnam War Watergate

Latest read: The Vietnam War: An Intimate History

The Vietnam War: An Intimate History by Geoffrey Ward and Ken Burns have authored one of the finest efforts to address the war from multiple perspectives and is perfect for Gen X and Millennials. This compliments Burns’ highly acclaimed 2017 PBS series.
The Vietnam War: An Intimate HistoryMany already recognize that Ken Burns is a gifted storyteller mixing media together to produce: The Civil War (1990), Baseball (1994), Jazz (2001), The War (2007), The National Parks: America’s Best Idea (2009), Prohibition (2011), and The Roosevelts (2014).

Prior to the PBS 10-part series, I knew Burns would deliver another great experience. For the book release, Ward and Burns do not disappoint. Their detailed stories and personal testimonials from soldiers and their families are deeply moving. Many young and old will more accurately understand a very tumultuous period in our nation’s history.

Burns’ access to newly released interviews and declassified materials from both sides show greater insights that inject confusion to long-held beliefs. This will lead many to question truths on all sides, from past government leaders to military generals.

Burns and Ward offer a number of key revelations:

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Education Reading Vietnam War

Pentagon Papers Part IV-C7a

Air War in the North: 1965 – 1968 Its interesting to read Pentagon Papers Volume IV-C7 to learn how global politics was playing out against China for a majority of the war. To be frank it’s all stated at the beginning of the volume on the US air war in the north:

1 Jul 65
Under Secretary of State George Ball memo to the President.
Ball argues for “cutting our losses” in Vietnam and negotiating an end to the war. A massive US intervention would likely require complete achievement of our objectives or humiliation, both at terrible costs.

Pentagon PapersBall was the Director of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey in London during the war which measured the impact of bombing Nazi Germany.  Before Johnson, Ball served President Kennedy and was the only one in the President’s inner circle who opposed escalating the war in Vietnam.

He told President Kennedy “within five years we’ll have 300,000 men in the paddies and jungles and never find them again.” In response to this prediction, “JFK is reported to have laughed and replied, “Well, George, you’re supposed to be one of the smartest guys in town, but you’re crazier than hell. That will never happen.” Further in this Volume George Ball wrote a telling statement before Kennedy’s assassination:

Politically, South Viet-Nam is a lost cause. The country is bled white from twenty years of war and the people are sick of it. The Viet Cong — as is shown by the Rand Corporation Motivation and Morale Study — are deeply committed. Hanoi has a Government and a purpose and a discipline. The “government” in Saigon is a travesty. In a very real sense, South Viet-Nam is a country with an army and no government. In my view, a deep commitment of United States forces in a land ‘war in South Viet-Nam would be a catastrophic error. If ever there was an occasion for a tactical withdrawal, this is it.

If only President Kennedy had listened to his advice. Maybe he did but did not live long enough to see it through.

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Education Reading Vietnam War

Pentagon Papers Part IV-C6c

Pentagon PapersVolume IV-C6c reveals a number of interesting items. The CIA’s contributions to prepping Westmoreland and a memorandum immediately following Tet had the following expanded topics of recommendation:

4. Drive on the Viet Cong Infrastructure
In our concern over the behavior of our allies, we must not neglect our enemies and the present opportunity to compound and exacerbate communist problems. Operation Phoenix which is targeted against the Viet Cong must be pursued more vigorously in closer liaison with the US. Vietnamese armed forces should be devoted to anti-infrastructure activities on a priority basis. The Tet offensive surfaced a good deal of the infrastructure and the opportunity to damage it has never been better. This would force the VC on the defensive and head off the establishment of local VC administrative organizations and VC attempts to set up provisional governmental committees.

7. The Prime Minister
We should solicit Ambassador Bunker’s views on the desirability of replacing the Prime Minister. If he is to be replaced we should agree on his successor beforehand, in consultation with Thieu and Ky.

The dreaded Phoenix Program.  For the first time Phoenix was mentioned in the Pentagon Papers.  CIA was always commenting on how effective this counter-terror program was in weakening the Viet Cong during an ‘unconventional war’ in the South following Tet.

For the first time in the Pentagon Papers this volume displays the full text of American journalists articles critical of the US command.  The first was written (Part IV-C6c – Page 65) by Neil Sheehan and Hedrick Smith:

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Education Reading Vietnam War

Pentagon Papers Part IV-C6c

I feel that the opening pages of Volume III: 1965–1967 US Ground Strategy and Force Deployments is a telling example of why we lost Vietnam.  One cannot help notice that we were way off the mark regarding the enemy in this volume.

Pentagon PapersWe relied upon technology to fight when behind the scenes we knew the political structure of the South Vietnamese government would never succeed, their desertion rate was rising and constant turnover of leaders weakened their moral. Yet we continued to support the South because of the risk (at the time) attributed to the domino effect regarding communism in Asia and the Cold War relationship with the Soviet Union:

The friendly picture gives rise to optimism for increased successes in 1968. In 1967, our logistics base and force structure permitted us to assume a fully offensive posture…A greatly improved intelligence system frequently enabled us to concentrate our superior military assets in preempting enemy military initiatives leading us to decisive accomplishments in conventional engagements. Materiel and tactical innovations have been further developed and employed: Long range reconnaissance patrols, aerial reconnaissance sensors, new observation aircraft, air-mobile operations and the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF), to name a few.

The MRF has been significantly successful in depriving the enemy of freedom and initiative in the population and resources rich Delta areas. The helicopter has established itself as perhaps the single most important tool in our arsenal — and we will welcome more.

While the helicopter may have won the day in the Ia Drang Valley at LZ X-Ray bad command decisions to not to use helicopters led to an ambush for those remaining troops walking from LZ X-Ray to LZ Albany, about 4 kilometers to the north-northeast. I’m no longer convinced about the accuracy of the report are concerning Tet:

The enemy’s TET offensive, which began with the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Saigon on 31 January 1968, although it had been predicted, took the U.S. command and the U.S. public by surprise, and its strength, length, and intensity prolonged this shock.

Predicted? The Pentagon Paper’s acknowledge the Tet offensive had been predicted.

Really?

Its safe to assume IV-C6c will reveal more problems with Clark Clifford as the newly installed Secretary of Defense.