Volume IV-C6c reveals a number of interesting items. The CIA’s contributions to prepping Westmoreland and a memorandum immediately following Tet had the following expanded topics of recommendation:
4. Drive on the Viet Cong Infrastructure
In our concern over the behavior of our allies, we must not neglect our enemies and the present opportunity to compound and exacerbate communist problems. Operation Phoenix which is targeted against the Viet Cong must be pursued more vigorously in closer liaison with the US. Vietnamese armed forces should be devoted to anti-infrastructure activities on a priority basis. The Tet offensive surfaced a good deal of the infrastructure and the opportunity to damage it has never been better. This would force the VC on the defensive and head off the establishment of local VC administrative organizations and VC attempts to set up provisional governmental committees.7. The Prime Minister
We should solicit Ambassador Bunker’s views on the desirability of replacing the Prime Minister. If he is to be replaced we should agree on his successor beforehand, in consultation with Thieu and Ky.
The dreaded Phoenix Program. For the first time Phoenix was mentioned in the Pentagon Papers. CIA was always commenting on how effective this counter-terror program was in weakening the Viet Cong during an ‘unconventional war’ in the South following Tet.
For the first time in the Pentagon Papers this volume displays the full text of American journalists articles critical of the US command. The first was written (Part IV-C6c – Page 65) by Neil Sheehan and Hedrick Smith:
Focus to this political debate and sense of dissatisfaction was given by a startlingly accurate account, published in The New York Times on 10 March, of General Westmoreland’s request and of the strategic reassessment which was being conducted within the executive branch of the government. It also indicated the growing doubt and unease in the nation concerning this policy review.
Its amazing to see a deep analysis of this article including:
The Sheehan article appeared one day before Secretary of State Dean Rusk appeared to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. His 2-day grilling indicated a considerable growth in open dissent within the Committee concerning U.S. policy in South Vietnam. Rusk even came under criticism from one of the few Administration supporters on the Committee, Senator Karl E. Mundt (R-SD), who warned him, “You are as aware as we are that the shift of opinion in this country is in the wrong direction” – meaning away from support of U.S. policy in Vietnam. “Something more convincing,” said Mundt, “has to come from the Administration as to what this is all about ‘to match’ the sacrifices we are making.” Rusk sidestepped all attempts by Senators Fulbright, Gore, and other questioners to pin him down on a possible increase in troops or other element of future Vietnam strategy. It would “not be right for me to speculate about numbers of possibilities,” said Rusk, while the President is consulting his advisors.
The final surpise in this volume was the full text of President Johnson’s surprise announcement to not run for a second term. Until reading the full transcript I never knew this famous address was completely focused on the impact of the war:
10. I Shall Not Seek, and I Will Not Accept…
Accordingly, I shall not seek, and I will not accept, the nomination of my party for another term as your President. But let men everywhere know, however, that a strong, a confident, and a vigilant America stands ready tonight to seek an honorable peace — and stand ready tonight to defend an honored cause — whatever the burden, whatever whatever the sacrifices that the price duty may require.
We were in for another seven years of fighting in Vietnam….with many more losses of American lives.