Hell In A Very Small Place: The Siege Of Dien Bien Phu
by Bernard Fall. Fall remains a respected educator, journalist and maybe one of the few to master counterinsurgency in the 20th century. He correctly predicted the failure of French efforts to re-colonize Indochina after World War II. He delivers a first hand account, on the ground with French troops beginning in 1953. He returned to Indochina multiple times over the next 14 years before dying in a 1967 ambush accompanying US troops in Operation Chinook II.
On more than one occasion, in the opening chapters the French considered permanently passing on Dien Bien Phu as a location to confront the Viet Minh to stop their push into Laos. Google Satellite Map of the valley Dien Bien Phu.
At first glance this is a Greek Tragedy. Yet Fall reveals, to simply save face on the global stage France continued to send men to their deaths over the 56 day siege. In Paris and Hanoi the commitment was NOT to win the war but rather simply hold the garrison as means to strengthen negotiations at the Geneva Accords.
At the earliest stages of the French occupation General Henri Navarre and Lt. General Rene Cogny would spare many times over the definition of the Dien Bien Phu defensive parameter with tragic consequences. Cogny defined Dien Bien Phu as a guerrilla camp with a ‘mooring point’ defense. Navarre interpreted a ‘heghog’ or airhead defense be established. The heghog recently proved successful against the Viet Minh at the Battle of Na San. Regardless the French defensive positions were never implemented to withstand the Viet Minh onslaught that came in waves and deadly accurate cannon fire.
Hell In A Very Small Place reveals during this early confusion French intelligence intercepted multiple radio messages revealing strong evidence of the enemy’s shift of two established divisions heading towards Dien Bien Phu. Yet this intelligence was only debated between Navarre and Cogny. They never acted on this intelligence. This led to increased disagreements between the two at the cost of their men.
No French military leader could forecast a cease-fire in the Korean War. This permitted Communist China to shift much-needed weapons from Soviet Russia and material into Dien Bien Phu in mid 1953.
It is discouraging to read Fall’s account of the Allied losses around Dien Bien Phu beginning in November 1953, three months before the Viet Minh would launch their initial attack at Dien Bien Phu. The cold war shifted tides from Korea to Indochina.
Fall’s other recognized book Street without Joy reveals how 400 French Union troops were confronted by nearly 1,000 Viet Minh in hand to hand combat. They “simply fixed bayonet and walked into death.” Fall’s Hell In A Very Small Place extends this horrific sacrifice.
Several books on this battle that I have read over the past two years are well researched, second-hand accounts. Simpson was the single American intelligence member actually within the fortress at the beginning of the siege. Many French officers who were to fight and die over the 59-day siege engaged Simpson during the buildup around the garrison.
